GUSTAV    POLLAK 


Published  by  The  New  York  Evening  Post  Co. 


ELLA  KITIQ  ADAIUS 


Compliments  of 


New  York,  July  16,  1917 


The  House  of  Hohenzollern 

and 

The  Hapsburg  Monarchy 


Originally  published  in 

The  New  York  Evening  Post  and 
The  New  York  Nation 

By 
GUSTAV  POLLAK 


Published  by 
The  New  York  Evening  Post  Co. 


Copyright  1917,  New  York  Evening  Post  Co. 


SRLF 
URL 

P. 

515 


hn 

CONTENTS 


Pi>ge 

The  House  of  Hohenzollern  .  .  .  .  5 
Bismarck's  Neglected  Policies  ...  23 
The  Vision  of  a  Central  Europe  .  .  33 

Austria's  Opportunity 59 

The  Future  of  Bohemia 67 

Hungary  and  the  Fall  of  Tisza .  .  .81 
The  Poles  of  Austria  .  95 


The  House  of  Hohenzollern 

[From  The  New  York  Nation,  March  22,  1917.] 

T  N  all  discussions  of  the  fate  of  Ger- 
-*•  many  in  case  of  her  ultimate  defeat, 
the  question  of  the  attachment  of  the 
people  to  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  plays 
an  important  part.  That  Prussian  loyalty 
will  be  equal  to  almost  any  test  admits 
scarcely  of  doubt,  but  the  question  natur- 
ally suggests  itself,  Will  other  subjects 
of  the  Empire,  notably  South  Germans, 
remain  unshaken  in  their  devotion  to  a 
dynasty  that  is  responsible,  as  all  Germans 
must  eventually  recognize,  for  the  most 
disastrous  war  in  history?  It  is  difficult  to 
make  predictions  at  the  present  time,  with 
the  fortunes  of  war  still  trembling  in  the 
balance.  One  may  safely  say,  however, 
that  from  the  establishment  of  the  present 
Empire  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  every 
non-Prussian  has  been,  first  of  all,  a 
Saxon,  Bavarian,  Wiirttemberger,  etc., 
and  only  secondarily  a  German.  We  have 
on  this  point  the  highly  instructive  cor- 


roboration  of  so  excellent  an  authority  as 
Prince  Bismarck.  He  says,  in  the  thir- 
teenth chapter  of  his  "Recollections": 

Never,  not  even  at  Frankfort,  did  I 
doubt  that  the  key  to  German  politics  was 
to  be  found  in  princes  and  dynasties,  not 
in  publicists,  whether  in  parliament  and 
the  press  or  on  the  barricades. 

In  order  that  German  patriotism  be 
active  and  effective,  it  needs  dependence 
on  a  dynasty.  Independent  of  dynasty, 
patriotism,  as  a  practical  matter,  rarely 
reaches  its  full  height.  .  .  .  It  is  as 
a  Prussian,  a  Hanoverian,  a  Wurttem- 
berger,  a  Bavarian,  or  Hessian,  rather 
than  as  a  German,  that  he  is  disposed  to 
give  unequivocal  proof  of  patriotism. 
The  German  love  of  the  Fatherland  has 
need  of  a  prince  on  whom  it  can  concen- 
trate its  attachment.  Suppose  that  all  the 
German  dynasties  were  suddenly  deposed ; 
there  would  then  be  no  likelihood  that  the 
German  national  sentiment  would  suffice 
to  hold  all  Germans  together,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  international  law,  amid 
the  friction  of  European  politics,  even  in 
the  form  of  federated  Hanse  towns  and 
imperial  rural  communes  ( "Reichsdorf- 
er").  The  Germans  would  fall  a  prey  to 


nations  more  closely  welded  together  if 
they  once  lost  the  tie  which  rests  in  the 
sense  of  the  common  importance  of  their 
princes. 

Bismarck  was  never  under  any  illusions 
as  to  the  feeling  of  non-Prussian  Germans 
towards  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty.  After 
the  war  of  1866  he  labored  hard  to  con- 
vince King  William  that  it  would  be  a 
serious  mistake  to  punish  Bavaria  by 
forcing  her  to  give  up  Anspach  and  Bay- 
reuth  to  Prussia,  just  as  it  would  be  to 
compel  Austria  to  give  up  part  of  her 
possessions.  "I  gauged,"  he  wrote,  "the 
proposed  acquisitions  from  Austria  and 
Bavaria  by  asking  myself  whether  the  in- 
habitants, in  case  of  future  war,  would 
remain  faithful  to  the  King  of  Prussia 
after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Prussian  of- 
ficials and  troops  and  continue  to  accept 
commands  from  him;  and  I  had  not  the 
impression  that  the  population  of  these 
districts,  which  had  become  habituated  to 
Bavarian  and  Austrian  conditions,  would 
be  disposed  to  meet  Hohenzollern  predi- 
lections." 


All  this  is  well  known.  South-German 
dislike  of  Prussian  ways  is  as  old  as  the 
history  of  the  Electors  of  Brandenburg 
and  as  recent  as  the  present  war,  with  its 
acknowledged  friction  between  Prussian 
and  non-Prussian  commanders  of  the 
Central  armies.  The  Hohenzollerns  have 
ever  ruled  with  a  heavy  hand,  in  peace  as 
in  war,  and  they  do  not  go  out  of  their 
way  to  enlist  the  sympathies  of  non-Prus- 
sians. Nor  is  it  in  politics  and  in  warfare 
only  that  the  antagonism  between  the 
Prussians  and  the  people  of  other  parts 
of  Germany  has  found  expression.  Ger- 
man literature  gives  abundant  proof  that 
the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  and  the  liberal 
sentiment  of  Germany  have  ever  been  far 
apart.  None  of  the  rulers  of  the  house  of 
Hohenzollern  befriended  German  poets, 
with  the  single  exception  of  the  ill-starred 
Frederick  III  (while  still  Crown  Prince) , 
unless  their  verses  glorified  Prussian 
deeds.  The  greatest  of  Prussian  rulers 
ignored  contemptuously  the  greatest  of 
German  poets,  and  Lessing  and  Heine  had 
as  little  cause  to  look  kindly  upon  Berlin 

8 


as  Goethe.  Goethe  visited  the  Prussian 
capital  with  Karl  August  of  Weimar  in 
May,  1778,  and  his  impressions  of  Berlin 
life  and  of  the  surroundings  of  the  King 
were  far  from  favorable.  "I  have  got 
quite  close  to  old  Fritz,"  he  wrote,  "having 
seen  his  gold,  his  silver,  his  statues,  his 
apes,  his  parrots,  and  heard  his  own  curs 
twaddle  about  the  great  man."  The  King 
and  the  poet  had  nothing  in  common. 
Frederick's  judgment  of  Goethe's  "Gotz 
von  Berlichingen"  was  as  follows:  "Voila 
un  Goetz  de  Berlichingen  qui  parait  sur 
la  scene,  imitation  detestable  de  ces  mau- 
vaises  pieces  anglaises,  et  le  parterre  ap- 
plaudit  et  demande  avec  enthousiasme  la 
repetition  de  ces  "degoutantes  platitudes." 
Frederick  the  Great  cared  only  for  French 
savants;  he  made  one  President  of  the 
Academy  of  Sciences,  another  Librarian. 
Goethe  was  not  at  all  in  sympathy  with 
Frederick's  plan  of  putting  the  federation 
of  German  sovereigns  on  a  strong  military 
basis.  He  feared  not  so  much  Prussia  as 
the  Prussian  King,  who  had  no  considera- 
tion for  small  states  like  Saxe- Weimar. 


In  the  summer  of  1780  he  spoke  in  the 
Aristophanic  little  play  "Die  Vogel,"  of 
"the  Black  Eagle  with  his  ever-ready 
claws." 

Under  Frederick's  successors  the  state 
of  affairs  in  Prussia  was  even  less  to 
Goethe's  liking.  Frederick  William  II 
discouraged  the  development  of  science 
and  free  speech  by  every  means  in  his 
power.  Kant  barely  escaped  being  de- 
prived of  his  professorship.  The  next 
King,  Frederick  William  III,  and  his 
Queen,  ostentationsly  ignored  Goethe  on 
their  visits  to  Weimar. 

Schiller  did  not  fare  so  ill  in  his  rela- 
tions with  the  Hohenzollerns,  but  he  was 
not  spared  by  the  Berlin  bureaucracy.  In 
the  last  year  of  his  life  he  wished  for  a 
wider  sphere  of  activity  than  was  afforded 
him  in  Weimar  and  Jena.  He  visited 
Berlin  in  May,  1804,  and  Queen  Luise 
was  seemingly  anxious  to  have  him  settle 
there.  On  his  return  to  Weimar  he  wrote 
to  the  royal  Cabinet  Counsellor  Beyme 
that,  while  he  found  himself  unable  to 
leave  Weimar  permanently,  he  should  be 

10 


willing,  under  certain  conditions,  to  spend 
a  few  months  every  year  in  Berlin,  but 
no  answer  to  his  letter  was  vouchsafed  him. 
Lesjsing  had  at  various  times  gone  to 
Berlin  in  the  hope  of  finding  there  some 
suitable  position.  At  one  time,  in  1765, 
he  seemed  to  have  some  prospect  of  get- 
ting the  royal  librarianship.  He  was  pro- 
posed to  the  King  by  one  of  his  French 
favorites,  Colonel  Guichard,  but  Freder- 
ick, who  had  become  prejudiced  against 
Lessing  through  Voltaire's  version  of  a 
previous  quarrel  between  the  two,  refused 
to  consider  the  suggestion.  The  position 
was  offered  to  Winckelmann,  but  he  de- 
clined it  on  account  of  the  low  salary,  and 
Lessing's  name  was  once  more  brought 
forward  by  Guichard.  Frederick  there- 
upon declared  with  vehemence  that  a 
Frenchman  would  get  the  place,  and  so  a 
Frenchman  did.  Lessing  felt  the  disap- 
pointment keenly.  He  wrote  to  his  father 
later  on:  "I  left  Berlin  after  the  only 
thing  that  I  had  so  long  hoped  for  and 
that  had  long  been  held  out  to  me  was 
denied  me."  It  is  safe  to  say,  however, 
11 


that  Frederick  would  never  have  found  in 
Lessing  a  pliant  employee,  such  as  he  liked 
to  have  near  him.  Lessing  had  previously, 
in  1764,  declined  the  offer  of  a  professor- 
ship of  rhetoric  in  the  University  of 
Konigsberg  because  of  the  condition  that 
he  was  to  deliver  annually  a  eulogy  of 
the  King. 

It  is  interesting  to  contrast  with  these 
experiences  of  Lessing  in  Prussia  the  at- 
titude of  the  Austrian  authorities  towards 
contemporaneous  men  of  letters.  Lessing 
wrote  to  Nicolai:  "Let  some  one  dare  to 
write  in  Berlin  as  freely  as  Sonnen- 
fels  is  writing  in  Vienna."  As  early 
as  1711  Emperor  Charles  VI  had  made 
Leibnitz  an  Aulic  Councillor  and  a  baron 
of  the  Empire,  and  when  the  philosopher 
came  to  Vienna  in  1713  and  submitted  to 
the  Emperor  a  draft  of  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht,  he  received  an  annual  pension  of 
2,000  florins,  which  Charles  offered  to 
double  if  Leibnitz  agreed  to  settle  in  the 
Austrian  capital. 

The  list  of  literary  men  who  suffered 
from  Prussian  reactionism  is  a  long  one. 

12 


Borne,  Herwegh,  and  Hoffmann  von 
Fallersleben,  among  others,  showed  that 
there  was  mutual  dislike,  but  no  one  em- 
bodied his  hatred  of  Prussia  in  such  flam- 
ing words  as  Heine ;  witness  the  preface  to 
his  "Franzosische  Zustande."  After  speak- 
ing of  Metternich's  cynical  but  open  de- 
fiance of  liberalism  and  the  mulish  con- 
sistency of  the  Emperor  Francis,  he  pro- 
ceeded : 

As  regards  Prussia  we  may  speak  in  a 
different  tone.  Here  at  least  we  are  not 
restrained  by  respect  for  the  sacredness  of 
the  head  of  the  German  Empire.  The 
learned  minions  on  the  banks  of  the  Spree 
may  dream  of  a  great  Emperor  of  the 
house  of  Borussia  and  proclaim  Prussian 
hegemony,  with  all  its  glorious  lordliness, 
but  thus  far  the  long  fingers  of  the  Hohen- 
zollern  have  not  yet  succeeded  in  grasping 
the  crown  of  Charlemagne  and  dump- 
ing it  into  the  same  bag  with  so  many 
Polish  and  Saxon  jewels.  .  .  . 

It  is  true  that  recently  many  friends  of 
the  Fatherland  have  desired  the  enlarge- 
ment of  Prussia  and  hoped  to  see  in  the 
kings  the  masters  of  a  united  Germany. 

13 


They  have  held  out  a  bait  to  patriots  and 
talked   of   Prussian   liberalism,   and   the 
friends  of  liberty  have  begun  to  look  con- 
fidingly towards  the  Linden  of  Berlin, 
but  as  for  me,  I  have  never  shared  their 
confidence.     On  the  contrary,  I  watched 
with  anxiety  the  Prussian  eagle,  and  while 
others  spoke  with  so  much  warmth  of  how 
this  bold  eagle  turned  his  eye  toward  the 
sun,  I  watched  all  the  more  carefully  his 
claws.    I  did  not  trust  this  Prussian,  this 
tall  and  canting  white-gaitered  hero,  with 
his  wide  mouth  and  his  rapacious  stomach 
and  his  corporal's  stick,  which  he  first 
dipped  in  holy  water  before  laying  it  on. 
I  disliked  this  philosophic  military  despot- 
ism, its  mixture  of  small  beer,  lies,  and 
sand.    Repulsive  beyond  expression  was  to 
me   this   Prussia,   this   stiff,   hypocritical 
Prussia,  this  Tartuffe  among  the  nations. 
Heine  allowed  himself  in  his  verse  to 
go  even  further  in  denouncing  Prussia 
and    the    house    of    Hohenzollern,    but 
though  as  a  poet  and  as  a  wit  he  abused 
his  double  license,  he  but  over-emphasized 
the  grievances  of  liberal  Germany.    There 
is  perhaps  in  all  literature  no  similar  in- 

14 


stance  of  a  dynasty  incurring  such  fierce 
hatred  on  the  part  of  one  of  the  greatest 
writers  of  the  nation. 

Whatever  concessions  any  ruler  of  the 
house  of  Hohenzollern,  since  the  days  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  made  to  liberal  ideas 
were  wrung  from  him  by  bitter  political 
necessity.  The  humiliating  peace  of  Til- 
sit forced  Frederick  William  III  to  adopt 
the  reform  plans  of  Stein  and  Harden- 
berg,  but  the  stifling  period  of  reaction 
that  followed  the  War  of  Liberation,  in 
the  latter  reign  of  the  King  and  that  of  his 
successors,  Frederick  William  IV  and  the 
Prince  Regent  (afterwards  William  I), 
was  unrelieved,  down  to  the  Revolution 
of  1848,  by  any  breath  of  freedom.  Prus- 
sia was  ready  for  Bismarck.  From  the 
outset  there  was  no  thought  in  his  mind 
of  making  Prussia  great  in  order  to  make 
her  free.  He  sounded  the  keynote  of  his 
future  policy  in  a  speech  in  the  Prussian 
Diet  on  December  3,  1850,  when  he  said: 
"According  to  my  conviction,  Prussian 
honor  does  not  consist  in  Prussia's  play- 
is 


ing  the  Don  Quixote  all  over  Germany 
for  the  benefit  of  mortified  parliamentary 
celebrities,  who  consider  their  local  con- 
stitution in  danger.  I  look  for  Prussian 
honor  in  Prussia's  abstinence  before  all 
things  from  every  shameful  union  with 
democracy."  Bismarck's  ideal  was  a 
great  Prussia  and  only  incidentally  a 
great  Germany;  a  liberal  Prussia  or  a 
liberal  Germany  was  never  a  part  of  his 
programme.  In  1863,  shortly  after  his 
accession  to  the  Prussian  Ministry  of 
State,  he  wrote  to  Count  von  der  Goltz, 
his  successor  as  Ambassador  to  France: 
"The  pursuit  of  the  phantom  of  popular- 
ity in  Germany,  which  we  have  been  car- 
rying on  for  the  last  forty  years,  has  cost 
us  our  position  in  Germany  and  in 
Europe,  and  we  shall  not  win  it  back  by 
allowing  ourselves  to  be  carried  away  by 
the  stream,  persuaded  that  we  are  direct- 
ing its  course,  but  only  by  standing  firmly 
upon  our  legs,  and  being  first  of  all  a 
Great  Power  and  a  German  Federal 
State  afterwards." 

16 


Bismarck  remained  true  to  his  policy 
throughout  his  rule,  yet  when  all  its  fruits 
had  been  garnered  in,  and  he  was  surveying 
the  past  from  his  retreats  at  Friedrichsruh 
and  Varzin,  a  gnawing  doubt  as  to  the 
permanency  of  the  structure  he  had  erect- 
ed overcame  him.  "History  shows,"  he 
wrote,  "that  in  Germany  it  is  the  Prussian 
stock  whose  individual  character  is  most 
strongly  marked,  and  yet  no  one  could 
decisively  answer  the  question  whether, 
supposing  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  and 
all  its  rightful  successors  to  have  passed 
away,  the  political  cohesion  of  Prussia 
would  survive.  Is  it  quite  certain  that 
the  eastern  and  western  divisions,  that  the 
Pomeranians  and  Hanoverians,  the  na- 
tives of  Holstein  and  Silesia,  of  Aachen 
and  Konigsberg,  would  then  continue  as 
they  now  are,  armed  together  in  the  indis- 
soluble unity  of  the  Prussian  state?" 

Many  a  German  student  of  history  who 
ponders  at  the  present  time  the  doubt  as 
to  the  stability  of  the  Hohenzollern  dy- 
nasty expressed  by  Bismarck  will  recall 
the  voice  of  a  far-sighted  German,  the  his- 
17 


torian  Gervinus,  who,  when  the  unifica- 
tion of  Germany  was  an  accomplished 
fact,  wrote  an  open  letter  to  the  Prussian 
King,  "An  das  Preussische  Konigshaus" 
(published  posthumously  in  1872),  in 
which  he  impressively  argued  that  the  an- 
nexation of  German  lands  by  Prussia 
after  the  war  of  1866  had  disgraced  the 
house  of  Hohenzollern,  and  that  it  car- 
ried the  seeds  of  future  evil  with  it.  All  the 
glories  of  the  war  of  1870  did  not  blind 
Gervinus  to  the  dangers  threatening  a 
Germany  founded  on  militarism  and  not 
on  justice  and  fair  dealing.  He  foresaw 
with  dread  the  creation  of  a  military  state 
such  as  the  world  had  not  seen  even  when 
Napoleon  was  at  the  height  of  his  power. 
"We  have,"  he  wrote,  "as  regards  power 
taken  the  place  of  France,  but  we  shall 
draw  upon  ourselves  all  the  hatred  that 
France  incurred."  The  following  words 
have  acquired  an  added  impressiveness 
through  the  events  of  the  past  two  years: 
"Is  it  not  a  fact  that,  at  the  time  of  the 
Luxemburg  complications,  when  the 
secret  treaties  of  alliance  between  Prussia 

18 


and  the  South  German  states  were  made 
public,  the  anger  and  suspicion  of  all  Gov- 
ernments were  aroused  when  it  was  shown 
that  one  day  before  the  Peace  of  Prague 
a  principal  article  of  the  Treaty  had  been 
violated?  Can  we  ignore  the  fact  that  the 
new  doctrine,  'Might  before  right,'  sur- 
rounded as  it  is  by  all  the  halo  of  a  bril- 
liant statesmanship,  has  greatly  under- 
mined the  hitherto  prevailing  principle  of 
non-intervention  among  English  states- 
men of  the  old  type?" 

Developments  within  the  German  Em- 
pire since  1871  have  justified  the  appre- 
hensions of  those  who,  like  Gervinus,  saw 
in  the  overshadowing  importance  of  Prus- 
sia an  ominous  menace  to  the  smaller  Ger- 
man states.  Their  privileges  as  compon- 
ent parts  of  the  German  Empire  have  be- 
come a  mere  mockery  under  a  Constitu- 
tion which  vests  the  Imperial  succession  in 
the  house  of  Hohenzollern,  with  its  heredi- 
tary right  in  the  Presidency  of  the  Feder- 
ation, the  casting  vote  of  Prussia  in  case 
of  a  tie  in  the  Federal  Council,  a  perma- 
nent Prussian  majority  in  the  Reichstag, 

19 


and  the  prerogative  of  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia as  German  Emperor  in  calling,  ad- 
journing, and  proroguing  the  Reichstag. 
Parliamentary  government  in  the  real 
sense  of  the  word  has  become  impossible 
under  a  system  which  leaves  the  Imperial 
Ministers  independent  of  the  will  of  the 
Reichstag  and  relegates  the  Chancellors 
of  the  Empire  to  the  position  of  mere  tools 
of  a  Hohenzollern  King.  A  further  ex- 
pansion of  Prussia  could  only  take  place 
with  a  corresponding  loss  of  prestige  on 
the  part  of  the  smaller  states.  What, 
these  states  must  have  asked  themselves 
more  than  once  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  will  be  our  gain  if  Prussian  general- 
ship triumphs?  It  is  not  too  early  to 
raise  the  question  as  to  what  will  be  their 
portion  if  Prussian  supremacy  ends  in 
military  disaster. 

In  any  case,  the  day  cannot  be  far  dis- 
tant when  the  intrinsic  rights  of  Prussia 
to  the  part  within  the  Empire  she  has 
arrogated  to  herself  will  be  seriously  ques- 
tioned by  descendants  of  those  German 
stocks  which  contributed  so  largely  to  the 

20 


power  of  the  old  Germanic  Empire  during 
the  thousand  years  of  its  existence. 
Franconians,  Saxons,  Luxemburgs, 
Hohenstaufen,  as  well  as  Hapsburgs,  fur- 
nished the  great  rulers  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  long  before  a  Hohenzollern  was 
dreamed  of  as  a  possible  Emperor.  In 
these  days  of  dynastic  upheavals  in  other 
countries  the  experience  of  Germany  as  an 
hereditary  monarchy  within  less  than  fifty 
years  cannot  be  thrown  into  the  scales  as 
against  the  history  of  an  elective  Empire 
of  a  thousand  years. 

Prussia's  supremacy  as  the  German 
Kulturstaat  par  excellence  has  been  too 
long  assumed  by  militarists  and  Junkers, 
and  too  easily  acquiesced  in  by  the  rest 
of  Germany.  Even  in  a  purely  military 
sense,  Prussia,  according  to  Bismarck 
himself,  has  long  ceased  to  be  as  produc- 
tive of  great  talents  as  was  the  case  in  the 
time  of  Frederick  the  Great.  "Our  most 
successful  commanders,"  he  wrote  in  his 
Memoirs,  "Bliicher,  Gneisenau,  Moltke, 
Goeben,  were  not  Prussians  originally, 
nor,  in  the  civil  administration,  were  Stein, 

21 


Hardenberg,  Motz,  and  Grolman."  The 
list  of  great  Germans  in  other  fields  who 
were  not  Prussians  by  birth  is  endless.  The 
names  of  Leibnitz,  Liebig,  Bopp,  Grimm, 
Hegel,  Gauss,  Ehrenberg,  Bach,  Wag- 
ner, of  Goethe,  Schiller,  Lessing,  and 
many  others  of  similar  eminence,  leap  to 
the  mind  at  once.  And  Durer  and  Hol- 
bein, the  South  Germans,  marked  the 
climax  of  all  German  art  long  before  the 
Mark  Brandenburg  had  become  the  King- 
dom of  Prussia. 

Bismarck's  doctrines  and  Hohenzol- 
lern  principles  are  now  being  tried  in  the 
furnace  of  a  world  war.  Not  all  that  can 
be  said,  and  must  justly  be  said,  of  Prus- 
sian leadership  in  the  intellectual  and  ma- 
terial development  of  Germany  can  ob- 
scure the  patent  failure  of  the  Hohenzol- 
lern  dynasty.  Prussian  hegemony  may 
have  fed  the  German  mind  and  body,  but  it 
has  starved  the  German  soul. 


22 


Bismarck's  Neglected 
Policies 

[From  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  April  14,  1917.] 

OINCE  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the 
^  question  has  often  been  asked,  What 
would  Germany's  policy  in  1914  have  been 
if  Bismarck  had  been  alive?  Would  there 
have  been  any  war  at  all?  In  the  first 
flush  of  victory  the  German  people  in- 
voked the  name  of  Bismarck  as  that  of  a 
patron  saint  blessing  their  arms  and  re- 
joicing in  the  fruits  of  his  wisdom.  Later 
on  less  was  heard  of  Bismarck's  share  in 
preparing  Germany  for  this  war,  and  to- 
day his  achievements  are  beginning  to  be 
viewed  in  a  different  light.  History  is 
not  only  being  made  but  rewritten.  His- 
toriographers ask  themselves.  Can  the 
fame  of  the  man  who  brought  about  Ger- 
man unity  after  three  successful  wars  sur- 
vive unscathed  the  prodigiously  unsuccess- 
ful one  that  was  their  result? 

23 


The  thought  of  a  powerful  military  at- 
tack on  Germany  often  haunted  Bis- 
marck in  his  retirement.  The  forestalling 
of  a  coalition  against  Germany  was  to  be 
the  crowning  work  of  his  diplomacy.  Any 
means  to  that  end  seemed  proper  to  him. 
He  brought  about  the  Triple  Alliance,  not 
because  he  considered  Austria-Hungary 
and  Italy  natural  or  particularly  desirable 
allies  of  Germany,  but  because  he  felt  that, 
with  any  two  strong  military  countries 
backing  Germany,  she  could  withstand  a 
possible  coalition  of  any  other  two  of  the 
great  Powers  against  her.  Much  as  he 
had  disliked  and  distrusted  Austria  all  his 
life,  he  preferred  her,  on  the  whole,  to 
Russia  as  an  ally  against  France.  But  be- 
fore definitely  concluding  the  Triple  Al- 
liance, he  carefully  weighed  in  the  balance 
all  the  possible  combinations  against  Ger- 
many. Austria's  help  being  assured,  he 
felt  reasonably  safe  against  an  attack  by 
both  France  and  Russia.  "I  should  not 
consider,"  he  reasoned,  "a  simultaneous 
attack  by  our  two  great  neighbor  Em- 
pires, even  though  Italy  were  not  the  third 

24 


in  the  alliance,  as  a  matter  of  life  and 
death,"  but  the  situation  appeared  to  him 
much  more  serious  if  Italy  were  to  threaten 
Austria's  possessions  on  the  Adriatic. 
"In  that  case,"  he  wrote,  "the  struggle, 
the  possibility  of  which  I  anticipate, 
would  be  unequal."  And  imagining 
France  and  Austria  in  a  league  with 
Russia,  "no  words,"  he  said,  "are  needed 
to  show  how  greatly  aggravated  would  be 
the  peril  of  Germany."  In  other  words, 
he  could  conceive  of  an  attack  on  Ger- 
many by  three  Powers  as  being  literally 
a  matter  of  life  and  death.  And  reason- 
ing thus,  he  made  sure,  as  he  thought,  of 
the  friendship  of  both  Austria  and  Italy. 
Events  have  proved  not  so  much  Bis- 
marck's wisdom  as  the  folly  of  his  suc- 
cessors. It  would  never  have  entered  his 
mind  to  create  a  situation  like  that  which 
confronts  Germany  to-day,  with  fourteen 
countries,  including  the  United  States,  ar- 
rayed against  her.  He  certainly  did  not 
foresee  the  possibility  of  Germany  and 
Austria  jointly  declaring  war  on  Russia 
and  France  and  bringing  England  into 
25 


the  conflict,  while  forcing  Italy  to  break 
with  her  partners  in  the  Triple  Alliance. 
Bismarck  presupposed  that  Germany 
and  Austria  would  cultivate  peace  with 
Russia,  and  judged  that  their  alliance 
"would  not  lack  the  support  of  England." 
In  concluding  the  alliance  with  Austria- 
Hungary,  Bismarck  was  under  no  illusion 
as  to  the  difficulties  inherent  in  such  a 
partnership.  Official  statements  nowa- 
days overflow  with  assurances  of  the  most 
complete  harmony  between  the  two  em- 
pires. Bismarck  did  not  take  such  an 
idyllic  view  of  an  alliance  promoted  by 
him  solely  as  the  result  of  cold-blooded 
calculation. 

In  point  of  material  force — he  wrote  in 
his  Memoirs.^1  held  a  union  with  Russia 
to  have  the  advantage.  I  had  also  been 
used  to  regard  it  as  safer,  because  I  placed 
more  reliance  on  traditional  dynastic 
friendship,  on  community  of  conservative 
monarchical  instincts,  on  the  absence  of 
indigenous  political  divisions,  than  on  the 
fits  and  starts  of  public  opinion  among  the 
Hungarian,  Slav,  and  Catholic  popula- 
tion of  the  monarchy  of  the  Hapsburgs. 

26 


Complete  reliance  could  be  placed  upon 
the  durability  of  neither  union,  whether 
one  estimated  the  strength  of  the  dynastic 
bond  with  Russia,  or  of  the  German  sym- 
pathies of  the  Hungarian  populace.  If 
the  balance  of  opinion  in  Hungary  were 
always  determined  by  sober  political  cal- 
culation, this  brave  and  independent  peo- 
ple, isolated  in  the  broad  ocean  of  Slav 
population,  and  comparatively  insignifi- 
cant in  numbers,  would  remain  constant  to 
the  conviction  that  its  position  can  only  be 
secured  by  the  support  of  the  German  ele- 
ment in  Austria  and  Germany.  But  the 
Kossuth  episode,  and  the  suppression  in 
Hungary  itself  of  the  German  elements 
that  remained  loyal  to  the  Empire,  and 
other  symptoms  showed  that  among  Hun- 
garian hussars  and  lawyers  self-confidence 
is  apt  in  critical  moments  to  get  the  better 
of  political  calculation  and  self-control. 
Even  in  quiet  times  many  a  Magyar  will 
get  the  gypsies  to  play  to  him  the  song 
"Der  Deutsche  ist  ein  Hundsfott"  ("The 
German  is  a  blackguard"). 

Germany,  as  Bismarck  was  well  aware, 
was  not  loved  either  in  Russia  or  in 
Austria-Hungary.  "Could  anti-German 
rancor,"  he  asked,  "acquire  in  Russia  a 

27 


keener  edge  than  it  has  among  the  Czechs 
in  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  the  Slovenes  of 
the  provinces  comprised  within  the  earlier 
German  Confederation,  and  the  Poles  in 
Galicia?"  Nor  did  Bismarck  consider  the 
stability  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy as  assured  beyond  doubt.  "The 
factors  which  must  be  taken  into  account," 
he  wrote,  "are  as  manifold  as  is  the  mix- 
ture of  her  populations,  and  to  their  cor- 
rosive and  occasionally  disruptive  force 
must  be  added  the  incalculable  influence 
that  the  religious  element  may  from  time 
to  time,  as  the  power  of  Rome  wakes  or 
wanes,  exert  upon  the  directing  personal- 
ities." He  foresaw  that  not  only  Pan- 
Slavism  and  the  Bulgarian,  Bosnian,  Ser- 
vian, Rumanian,  the  Czech,  and  the  Polish 
questions,  but  also  the  Italian  question  in 
the  Trentino,  in  Trieste,  and  on  the  Dal- 
matian coast,  might  become  dangerous  not 
merely  as  affecting  Austria,  but  as  pre- 
cipitating a  European  crisis.  What  has 
been  so  often  asserted  and  as  often  official- 
ly denied,  as  to  the  friction  between  the 
German- Austrians  and  the  Czech  soldiery, 

28 


is  clearly  foretold  in  Bismarck's  state- 
ment: "In  Bohemia  the  antagonism  be- 
tween Germans  and  Czechs  has  in  some 
places  penetrated  so  deeply  into  the  army 
that  the  officers  of  the  two  nationalities  in 
certain  regiments  hold  aloof  from  one  an- 
other, even  to  the  degree  that  they  will  not 
meet  at  mess." 

Bismarck  did  not  shrink  from  war  if  it 
suited  his  purpose  of  aggrandizing  Ger- 
many and,  above  all,  Prussia,  but  he  never 
sought  war  needlessly.  "During  the  time 
that  I  was  in  office,"  he  wrote,  "I  advised 
three  wars,  the  Danish,  the  Bohemian,  and 
the  French;  but  every  time  I  first  made 
clear  to  myself  whether  the  war,  if  suc- 
cessful, would  bring  a  prize  worth  the 
sacrifices  which  every  war  requires,  and 
which  are  now  so  much  greater  than  in  the 
last  century."  He  considered  Germany 
as  perhaps  the  single  great  Power  in 
Europe  which  had  nothing  to  gain  by  pro- 
voking war.  "We  ought  to  do  all  we 
can,"  he  said,  "to  counteract  the  ill-feeling 
which  has  been  called  out  through  our 

29 


growth  to  the  position  of  a  really  great 
Power,  by  honorable  and  peaceful  use  of 
our  influence,  and  by  convincing  the 
world  that  a  German  hegemony  in 
Europe  is  more  useful  and  less  partisan 
and  also  less  harmful  to  the  freedom  of 
others  than  that  of  France,  Russia,  or 
England."  He  stated  emphatically  that 
Germany  required  no  increase  of  contigu- 
ous territory,  and  that  her  only  object 
should  be  to  convince  other  nations  of  her 
peaceful  intentions.  "I  have  followed  my 
own  prescription,"  he  remarked,  "not 
without  some  personal  reluctance,  in  my 
course  towards  Spain  in  the  question  of 
the  Caroline  Islands  and  towards  the 
United  States  in  that  of  Samoa." 

How  was  it  possible,  it  will  be  asked, 
that  German  statesmen  of  to-day,  know- 
ing all  about  Bismarck's  misgivings  as  to 
the  sincerity  of  the  friendship  between 
Austria  and  Germany,  and  about  his 
dread  of  embroiling  the  two  countries  in 
a  useless  war  against  France  and  Russia, 
could  enter  so  light-heartedly  upon  their 
stupendous  venture?  The  answer  is  to 

30 


be  sought  not  only  in  their  natural  ignor- 
ance of  their  own  limitations,  but  in  the 
example  of  unscrupulous  selfishness  and, 
if  need  be,  cynical  brutality  set  them  by 
their  great  protagonist  during  the  entire 
course  of  his  career.  Lacking  his  intel- 
lectual force  and  his  unrivalled  resource- 
fulness, they  thought  themselves  safe  in 
adopting  his  tactics  and  improving  upon 
them.  Was  it  not  Bismarck's  principle 
that  all  contracts  between  great  states 
cease  to  be  unconditionally  binding  as  soon 
as  they  are  tested  by  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence, and  that  no  great  nation  will  ever 
be  induced  to  sacrifice  itself  on  the  altar 
of  fidelity  to  contract?  Starting  with  this 
premise,  what  could  be  more  logical  than 
the  invasion  of  Belgium,  with  all  that  fol- 
lowed? 

Bismarck  had  no  diplomatic  scruples  of 
any  kind,  but  he  knew  how  to  guard  his 
diplomatic  secrets.  His  occasional  sincer- 
ity in  disclosing  the  past  was  his  best  asset 
in  making  future  deceit  possible.  It  is 
quite  clear  that  he  never  foresaw  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  war  between  the  United  States 

31 


and  Germany,  but  had  he  foreseen  it  he 
never  would  have  resorted  to  such  devices 
as  were  employed  by  his  successors,  the 
agile  Billow  and  the  ponderous  Bethmann- 
Hollweg.  Billow  was  puerile  enough  to 
imagine  that  a  Deutsch-Amerikanischer 
Nationalbund  would  forever  solidify  the 
sentiment  of  German- Americans  against 
their  adopted  country,  and  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  allowed  the  ingenious  Zimmer- 
mann  to  concoct  his  little  Mexican-Jap- 
anese scheme.  Not  such,  with  all  its  ter- 
giversations, was  Bismarck's  foreign 
policy.  Woe  to  the  German  people  that 
they  have  chosen  to  disregard  its  strength 
and  to  cling  to  its  weakness! 


32 


The  Vision  of  a  Central 
Europe 

[From  The  New  York  Nation,  December  14,  1916.] 

E  W  polemical  books  written  during  the 
present  war  have  called  for  serious 
criticism.  When  passion  shrieks,  reason  can 
only  be  silent.  Friedrich  Naumann's 
"Mitteleuropa"  (Central  Europe.  Trans- 
lated by  Christabel  M.  Meredith,  Lon- 
don: P.  S.  King  &  Son),  however,  stands 
in  some  respects  in  a  class  by  itself.  A 
fervent  economic  plea  for  Germany's 
future  expansion,  it  is  but  indirectly  con- 
cerned with  the  present  clash  of  arms  and 
ignores  international  hatreds.  The  book, 
which  has  had  an  extraordinary  vogue 
throughout  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, is  now  obtainable  in  an  English 
translation  (faithful,  though  by  no  means 
flawless)  to  which  Prof.  W.  J.  Ashley  has 
written  an  introduction.  He  speaks  of  it 
as  "far  and  away  the  most  important  book 
that  has  appeared  in  Germany  since  the 

33 


world-conflict  began."  Such  a  success 
challenges  thought,  even  aside  from  the  in- 
trinsic merits  of  the  work.  It  will  there- 
fore not  be  superfluous  to  examine  in  de- 
tail the  arguments  that  have  made  so 
powerful  an  appeal  to  German  and  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  readers. 

Herr  Naumann  is  a  member  of  the 
Reichstag  and  author  of  a  number  of 
books.  His  career  shows  strange  muta- 
tions of  principle — religious,  political,  and 
economic.  Originally  a  Lutheran  pastor 
and  Socialistic  evangelist,  he  abandoned 
the  pulpit  for  journalism  and  politics.  He 
founded  Die  Hilfe,  and  through  this 
journal  and  his  book  on  "Demokratie  und 
Kaisertum"  attempted  to  reconcile  the 
tenets  of  Social-Democracy  with  the  pre- 
vailing furore  for  naval  and  colonial  ex- 
pansion. The  National- Socialist  party 
being  unable  to  obtain  representation  in 
the  Reichstag,  Herr  Naumann  allied  him- 
self with  the  Volkspartei,  which  derived 
its  strength  mainly  from  the  middle-class 
radicals  of  southern  Germany.  As  an 
ardent  free-trader  and  advocate  of  certain 

34 


definite  legislative  measures,  he  succeeded 
in  gaining  a  seat  in  the  Reichstag,  where 
he  attempted  to  fuse  several  minor  radical 
groups  into  a  wing  of  the  Liberal  party. 
In  a  book  written  at  that  time,  his  "Neu- 
deutsche  Wirtschaftspolitik,"  he  predicted 
the  political  and  social  regeneration  of 
Germany  through  unrestricted  intercourse 
with  other  countries.  Such  was  Herr 
Naumann's  past  political  philosophy ;  what 
is  his  present  creed? 

Briefly  speaking,  Naumann  advocates, 
one  may  say  he  foretells,  as  in  a  prophetic 
vision,  a  combination — it  is  nowhere  di- 
rectly called  an  alliance — between  the  Ger- 
man Empire  and  the  Hapsburg  Mon- 
archy, offensive  and  defensive,  economic 
and  military,  into  which  as  many  neutral 
states  as  possible  may  and  should,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  self-interest,  eventually  enter.  The 
adhesion  of  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  states 
is  taken  for  granted.  The  advantages  of 
such  a  superstate  to  the  neutral  countries 
which  are  to  join  their  maritime  front  to 
the  territory  of  the  Central  Powers,  spe- 
cifically to  Holland,  Greece,  Rumania, 

35 


and  the  Scandinavian  countries,  are  but 
vaguely  alluded  to — for  prudential  rea- 
sons dictated  by  the  war.  The  main  pur- 
pose of  the  formation  of  this  "Central 
Europe"  is,  as  frankly  admitted  by  the 
author,  the  greater  good  of  the  two  prin- 
cipal countries,  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  Without  committing  himself 
to  any  definite  plan  for  the  organization  of 
this  vast  state,  Herr  Naumann  tentatively 
puts  forth  a  programme  which  he  says 
statesmen  of  the  future  may  modify  at 
their  pleasure.  This  includes  common  re- 
cruiting laws,  mutual  military  inspection, 
a  joint  committee  for  foreign  affairs,  joint 
boards  for  the  control  of  railways  and  of 
river  navigation,  common  coins  and  meas- 
ures, common  banking  and  commercial 
laws,  common  military  expenditures,  mu- 
tual liability  for  national  debts,  equality  of 
customs  tariffs,  joint  collection  of  customs, 
equal  laws  for  the  protection  of  labor, 
equal  laws  of  association  and  trust  laws, 
etc.  There  may  or  may  not  be  eventually 
free  trade  between  Germany  and  the 
group  of  states  that  are  to  join  her,  but 

36 


the  bond  of  cohesion  between  them  will 
primarily  be  a  political  one.  Economic 
considerations  will  adjust  themselves  to 
their  common  political  interests. 

In  the  programme  thus  outlined  the 
need  of  permanent  preparedness  for  war  is 
repeatedly  emphasized.  Hence  regulation 
of  the  storage  of  grain  becomes  a  matter 
of  paramount  importance.  This  and  similar 
measures  Herr  Naumann  would  entrust  to 
several  commissions,  which  he  proposes  to 
locate  as  follows:  Budapest  is  to  be  the 
grain  centre,  Prague  the  centre  for  all 
treaty  matters,  Hamburg  the  centre  of  the 
maritime  trade,  Berlin  the  exchange  cen- 
tre, and  Vienna  the  legal  centre.  But  it 
is  only  after  peace  has  been  declared  that 
it  will  be  possible  to  formulate  a  definite 
programme,  and  the  gist  of  such  a  pro- 
gramme can,  in  Herr  Naumann's  opinion, 
be  summed  up  in  two  words:  "better  or- 
ganization." It  was  Prussian  organiza- 
tion that  paved  the  way  for  the  successes  of 
this  war,  and  if,  says  he,  the  opponents  of 
Germany  like  to  label  the  intrinsic  con- 
nection between  the  works  of  peace  and 

37 


those  of  war  as  "German  militarism,"  they 
are  welcome  to  it.  The  wholesome  effect 
of  Prussian  military  discipline  pervades, 
in  his  view,  the  whole  of  Germany  from 
top  to  bottom. 

Enthusiastic  to  the  point  of  rhapsody  as 
Herr  Naumann  is  over  his  project,  he  does 
not  wholly  ignore  the  difficulties  of  its  exe- 
cution. He  realizes  that  the  Government 
of  Austria-Hungary  may  have  to  be 
argued  and  cajoled  into  a  partnership  in 
which  that  country  is  bound  to  be  the 
weaker  member.  Germany  will  have  to 
make  it  clear  that  there  is  no  thought  of 
interfering  with  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy,  and  that  the  deli- 
cate questions  of  race  and  language  which 
have  so  long  agitated  that  country  would 
be  let  alone  by  the  Germany  of  Central 
Europe. 

What  is  to  be  the  geographical  extent 
of  this  powerful  congeries  of  states?  It 
is  Herr  Naumann's  ambition  to  see  Cen- 
tral Europe  comprise  about  5,000,000 
square  miles,  that  is  to  say,  one-tenth  of 
the  inhabited  surface  of  the  globe.  He 

38 


arrives  at  his  estimate  by  a  series  of  daring 
steps.  Starting  with  the  450,000  square 
miles  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary, 
he  adds,  first,  the  900,000  square  miles  of 
"a  number  of  neighboring  European 
states,"  and  then  "claims"  all  of  European 
and  Asiatic  Turkey,  thereby  swelling  the 
figures  to  2,500,000  square  miles.  Add 
the  colonies  of  the  German  Empire  and 
you  have  4,000,000  square  miles,  and  "if 
we  venture  to  count  in  the  overseas  pos- 
sessions of  neighboring  states  which  have 
not  yet  joined  us,  we  may  arrive  at  ap- 
proximately 5,000,000  square  miles" — a 
figure  which  he  admits  is  "somewhat  arbi- 
trary." The  population  of  this  Central 
Europe,  beginning  with  the  116,000,000 
inhabitants  of  the  German  Empire  and 
Austria-Hungary,  will,  in  the  manner  de- 
scribed, mount  up  to  about  200,000,000, 
or,  roughly,  one-eighth  of  the  population 
of  the  globe. 

Fantastic  as  this  programme  seems  to 
be,  it  is  undeniable  that  Herr  Naumann's 
teachings  are  spreading,  and  will  have 
to  be  reckoned  with  in  the  future. 

39 


Already  Austrian  and  German  trade 
unions  have  given  their  adhesion  to  the 
plan,  and  even  councils  of  German  and 
Austrian  Socialists  have  approved  of  it. 
So  conservative  a  German  economist  as 
Professor  von  Schmoller  is  arguing  that 
the  present  time  urgently  calls  for  close 
tariff  arrangements  with  Austria-Hun- 
gary, and  that  "the  leading  men  of  nearly 
all  classes  and  parties  are  gradually  meet- 
ing under  this  flag."  Naumann  himself 
foresees  certain  objections  within  Ger- 
many itself.  He  fears  that  his  scheme 
will  be  viewed  with  suspicion  by  Prussian 
nobles,  the  conservative,  powerful,  and 
domineering  (herrschaftsstarke)  Old 
Prussian,  as  well  as  the  "Liberal  capital- 
ist," who,  though  for  opposite  reasons, 
equally  distrusts  Austria-Hungary.  To 
these  two  types  must  be  added  the  "Great- 
er-Germans," whose  ideal  is  a  purely  Ger- 
manic state,  and  who  are  already  groaning 
under  the  burden  of  the  Poles,  Danes,  and 
French  Alsatians  of  the  Empire. 

Herr  Naumann,  furthermore,  realizes 
that  the  Magyars  are  not  in  love  with  the 

40 


Germans,  but  he  relies  on  their  keen  desire 
to  retain  their  supremacy  over  the  Slavs, 
and  reasons  that  they  will  grasp  at  any- 
thing1 Germany  may  offer  them  to  attain 
their  ends.  From  a  purely  economic  point 
of  view,  Austria-Hungary  and  the  other 
members  of  the  Central  European  com- 
bination are  to  be  won  over  by  a  system  of 
mutual  tariff  preferences  which  shall  pro- 
tect the  industrially  weaker  countries. 

Herr  Naumann,  it  must  be  admitted, 
presents  his  case  with  considerable  skill. 
He  writes  picturesquely  and,  in  the  main, 
clearly  and  forcibly.  His  occasional  senti- 
mental outbursts,  and  the  studied  vague- 
ness to  which  German  writers  are  so  prone, 
but  enhance  the  interest  of  the  book  in 
German  eyes.  He  is  careful  not  to  burden 
his  readers  needlessly  with  statistics.  These 
and  certain  dry  historical  facts  are  relegat- 
ed to  a  separate  chapter  at  the  conclusion 
of  the  book. 

While  Naumann's  thesis  is  apparently  a 
simple  one,  he  finds  it  necessary  to  bolster 
it  up  with  assertions  and  prophecies  of 
various  kinds.  We  meet  at  the  outset  with 

41 


the  statement  that  there  is  no  room,  at  the 
present  time,  for  France  in  the  new  Cen- 
tral Europe.  Having  chosen  to  ally  her- 
self with  England,  she  will,  unfortunately 
for  her,  "in  the  near  future  become  a 
greater  and  better  Portugal."  Yet 
even  for  her  Heir  Naumann  would 
leave  a  door  open,  perhaps  only  in  a 
distant  future,  for,  like  so  many 
Germans,  he  professes  to  harbor  no 
ill-feelings  towards  France.  Italy,  too,  he 
does  not  consider,  for  all  time  to  come,  nec- 
essarily ineligible  to  partnership  in  Central 
Europe,  though  he  cautiously  adds,  "the 
armies  on  the  Isonzo  have  the  first  word." 
Germany's  present  ally,  Turkey,  being 
"antiquated"  and  separated  from  Central 
Europe,  both  geographically  and  national- 
ly, is  not  hailed  with  delight  as  a  future 
partner.  But  Central  Europe  will  eventu- 
ally determine  the  conditions  of  its  own 
existence.  Though  Herr  Naumann  care- 
fully refrains  throughout  his  book  from 
speaking  harshly  of  any  of  the  belligerent 
nations,  there  is  an  unmistakable  Bis- 
marckian  flavor  in  some  of  his  arguments. 

42 


All  participants  in  the  Great  War  must 
feel  that  neither  now  nor  in  the  future  can 
small  or  even  moderate-sized  countries 
have  any  voice  in  world  politics.  "Our 
conceptions  of  size  have  entirely  changed, 
only  very  large  states  can  assert  their  in- 
dividuality, all  the  little  ones  live  by  profit- 
ing from  the  quarrels  of  the  great,  and 
must  first  ask  their  permission  if  they 
would  make  an  unusual  move."  The  world 
thinks,  as  Cecil  Rhodes  says,  "in  contin- 
ents." A  generation,  Herr  Naumann  sur- 
mises, will  be  required  for  the  task  of  es- 
tablishing Central  Europe,  even  if  peace, 
declared  on  the  basis  of  victory  of  the  Ger- 
man-Austrian arms,  seals  the  permanent 
solidarity  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  Hohen- 
zollerns.  A  shade  of  doubt  as  to  this  soli- 
darity— hardly  as  to  the  victory  itself — 
enters  even  Herr  Naumann's  mind.  "The 
question  will  arise :  Are  the  Ambassadors 
from  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Budapest  going 
to  leave  the  hall  of  the  National  Peace 
Congress  as  open  and  honest  friends  or  as 
secret  opponents?"  If  peace  is  only  to 
pave  the  way  for  future  misunderstand- 

43 


ings,  Europe  will  face  another  Vienna 
Congress  of  1815.  "In  that  case,  for  what 
shall  we  have  sacrificed  our  sons  and  the 
mutilated  Hungarians  their  limbs?"  A 
perplexing  question,  indeed!  As  danger- 
ous as  the  admission  that  after  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace  "we  all  shall  be  more  careful 
than  hitherto  to  suppress  frivolous  pretexts 
for  war  and  to  strive  for  a  mutual  under- 
standing between  nations." 

For  Herr  Naumann,  as  for  every  Ger- 
man and  Austro-Hungarian,  the  war  be- 
gan "purely  as  a  defensive  one,"  though  in 
the  same  breath  he  tells  us  that  "in  the 
German  Empire  two  ideas  had  always  been 
present  in  the  minds  of  the  people  and  the 
Government:  that  sooner  or  later  a  break 
with  the  Czar  was  bound  to  come,  and  that 
some  time  there  would  have  to  be  a  fight 
with  England  for  the  control  of  the  seas. 
The  only  unexpected  thing  was  that  all 
came  together  with  a  rush — the  war  in 
France,  the  war  in  the  East,  and  the  naval 
war." 

Leaving  aside  Herr  Naumann's  specula- 
tions as  to  the  origin  of  the  war,  it  is  wrorth 

44 


while  to  raise  some  doubts  as  to  the  feasi- 
bility of  his  plans  after  its  conclusion. 
Economic  considerations  are  certainly 
powerful  factors  in  the  development  of 
modern  nations,  but  all  statesmen  must 
reckon  with  the  facts  of  human  nature. 
Nations  and  races  will  go  on  with  their  in- 
born or  cultivated  likes  and  dislikes  after 
the  war  as  before.  It  becomes  necessary 
to  remind  those  who  so  glibly  assume  Aus- 
tria-Hungary willingness  to  listen  to 
Germany's  siren  voice  after  the  war 
that  the  mutual  jealousies  of  Austria  and 
Prussia  are  of  very  long  standing,  and 
have  not  been  wholly  interrupted  by  the 
present  war.  It  was  Frederick  II  who  in- 
augurated the  systematic  policy  of  weaken- 
ing Austria  in  order  to  strengthen  Prussia. 
Conversely,  Joseph  II  sought  to  recover 
Austria's  prestige  by  isolating  Prussia  and 
regaining  new  territory,  whether  in  the 
East  or  in  the  West.  Thenceforth  there 
was  mutual  distrust  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, though  Joseph  II,  immediately  after 
Frederick's  death,  thought  for  a  moment 
of  burying  old  animosities  and  founding 
45 


an  Austro-Prussian  alliance  which  would 
guarantee  the  peace  of  Europe.  Prussia, 
however,  soon  emphasized  her  antagon- 
ism to  Austria  by  her  machinations  with- 
in the  German  Empire,  at  Mainz  and 
Worms,  while  Joseph  II  turned  to  Russia 
as  the  natural  friend  of  Austria.  Under 
Metternich's  regime  the  mutual  jealousies 
were  accentuated.  He  rejected  contempt- 
uously Stein's  plan  of  dividing  the  over- 
lordship  of  Austria  and  Prussia  in  Ger- 
many along  the  lines  of  the  Main.  Met- 
ternich  was  shortsighted  enough  to  think, 
even  after  the  disappearance  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire,  that  Austria  might  guide 
the  destinies  of  both  Germany  and  Italy, 
and  he  called  the  Congress  of  Vienna  to- 
gether with  this  end  in  view.  Prussia  never 
ceased  to  watch  her  opportunities,  and 
knew  how  to  bide  her  time. 

Bismarck,  who  is  generally  credited 
with  the  authorship  of  the  plan  for  a  Cen- 
tral Europe,  tells  us  in  his  "Gedanken  und 
Erinnerungen"  that  he  never  thought,  in 
the  days  of  the  German  Bund,  while  advo- 
cating the  union  of  all  Germany  on  a 

46 


dualistic  basis,  of  anything  but  Prussian 
hegemony.  He  frankly  told  Count 
Karolyi,  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  in 
1862:  "Our  relations  must  either  improve 
or  grow  worse.  You  will  learn  to  deal  with 
us  (Prussia)  as  a  European  Power." 
Throughout  his  career  Bismarck  never  lost 
his  contempt  for  Austria,  though  after  the 
war  of  1866,  foreseeing  the  Franco-Ger- 
man War  of  1870,  he  shrewdly  insisted  on 
treating  Austria  leniently  in  order  to  se- 
cure at  least  her  passive  attitude  towards 
Germany  later  on.  Austrians  still  remem- 
ber Silesia  and  Sadowa,  and  they  have  not 
grown  fonder  of  Prussia  during  the  pres- 
ent war.  Both  Austrians  and  Hungarians 
complain,  as  Herr  Naumann  admits,  of 
the  German,  and  especially  the  Prussian, 
want  of  consideration,  of  their  overbearing 
manners,  etc.  "Modern  Germans,"  he 
says,  "are  almost  everywhere  bad  German- 
izers."  "Why  is  it,"  he  naively  asks,  "that 
we  Germans  of  the  Empire  are  during  this 
war  so  little  liked  by  the  rest  of  the  world?" 
The  question  which  he  leaves  unan- 
swered was  discussed  at  some  length  dur- 

47 


ing  the  Franco-Prussian  War  in  an  edi- 
torial article  in  the  Nation  (Oct.  20,  1870: 
"Popular  Notions  of  Prussia.")  at  a  time 
when  the  Nation,  like  the  rest  of  the  most 
thoughtful  organs  of  public  opinion 
throughout  the  United  States,  was  strong- 
ly on  the  side  of  Germany.  Its  remarks 
are  pertinent  at  the  present  time : 

As  to  Prussia's  habitual  want  of  popu- 
larity, it  is  one  of  the  most  curious  phe- 
nomena in  modern  history.  Prussia  has 
invariably  been  disliked,  not  only  by  her 
enemies,  but  by  her  very  friends  and  allies. 
The  Poles,  of  course,  hate  her  (and  who 
would  blame  them  for  that?) ,  but  even  the 
Russians  dislike  her,  notwithstanding  the 
intimacy  and  relationship  of  the  two  sov- 
ereigns. So  do  the  Austrians,  so  did  the 
Bavarians  and  Wurttembergers,  the 
Dutch  and  the  Danes,  the  English  and  the 
Italians,  and  their  dislike  seems  to  have 
nothing  to  do  with  political  jealousies  or 
grievances.  Nor  do  the  French  form  an 
exception  to  the  rule,  although  it  is  but 
fair  to  say  that  before  the  war  at  least 
there  was  nothing  personal  even  in  their 
chauvinism.  There  must,  of  course,  be 
some  real  and  tangible  reason  for  all  this. 
It  is  natural  enough  that,  when  once  a 

48 


prejudice  exists  against  a  country,  the 
stranger  who  visits  or  traverses  it  can 
rarely  be  in  a  proper  condition  of  mind  for 
steering  clear  of  difficulties  and  scrapes, 
and  these  difficulties  will  enhance  rather 
than  correct  his  prejudices.  But  we  can 
hardly  call  prejudice  a  natural  aversion  to 
what  must  appear  forbidding  and  ungenial 
to  everybody  not  rendered  callous  by  life- 
long habit.  The  bureaucratic  hardness  of 
Prussian  officials,  and  the  rigid  compulsory 
method  with  which  Prussia  enforces  the 
acceptance  of  her  gifts  and  her  protection, 
as  well  as  of  her  burdens,  are  certainly  not 
calculated  to  beget  good  will,  and  we  can 
hardly  wonder  if  Prussia  enjoys  the 
strange  distinction  of  being  disliked  by  a 
good  many  of  her  own  people,  who  would 
willingly  allow  themselves  to  be  educated, 
vaccinated,  taxed,  and  drilled,  but  who 
either  object  to  the  official  modus  operandi 
or  are  anxious  to  sell  their  obedience  for  a 
fair  measure  of  constitutional  rights. 

Herr  Naumann  quotes  the  experience 
of  the  North-German  Confederation,  be- 
fore 1870,  in  its  dealings  with  South  Ger- 
many, as  an  example  of  how  easy  it  was 
to  overcome  the  scruples  of  Bavaria, 
Wiirttemberg,  Baden,  etc.,  concerning  a 

49 


closer  union  with  Prussia;  but  he  has  to 
admit  that  they  had  maintained  before  the 
Franco- German  War  an  attitude  of  dis- 
trust towards  Prussia  which  even  now  has 
not  wholly  disappeared.  "The  Berliner 
was  in  their  eyes  long  an  alien,  and  is 
so  in  part  even  to-day."  If  Germany  is 
defeated,  Prussia  will  be  less  an  object  of 
veneration  in  South  German  eyes  than 
ever  before;  but  even  if  she  is  victorious, 
will  the  feeling  between  South  Germans 
and  Prussians  be  all  that  may  be  desired? 
Will  there  be  unmixed  mutual  respect  and 
due  appreciation  of  what  each  has  accom- 
plished to  bring  about  victory?  Prussia's 
preponderance  in  Central  Europe  will  be 
far  greater  than  her  present  dominance  in 
Germany.  What  will  Bavaria,  Wurttem- 
berg,  and  Baden  have  gained  to  compen- 
sate them  for  sinking  into  positions  of  re- 
latively greater  inferiority  than  they  had 
been  chafing  under  before  the  war?  Herr 
Naumann  sees  only  a  benign  thought  in 
the  "controlling  concept  ( Oberbegriff )  of 
a  Central  Europe  dominating  over  Ger- 
mans, French,  Danes,  and  Poles  in  the 

50 


German  Empire,  over  the  Magyars,  Ger- 
mans, Rumans,  Slovaks,  Croats,  and  Serbs 
in  Hungary,  over  Germans,  Czechs,  Slo- 
vaks, Poles  and  Southern  Slavs  in  Aus- 
tria." All  these  will  "of  their  own  accord 
(von  selbst)"  speak  German — as  though 
Naumann  had  never  heard  of  bloody  riots 
in  Bohemia  over  the  question  of  using  the 
dual  languages  in  schools,  in  law  courts, 
etc.,  and  as  though  Prussia  had  not,  ac- 
cording to  Prince  Biilow,  failed  utterly  in 
her  attempts  to  impose  the  German  lan- 
guage with  an  iron  hand  on  the  recalci- 
trant school  children  of  Posen.  Nothing, 
however,  appears  difficult  to  the  senti- 
mentalist in  politics.  In  Herr  Naumann's 
eyes  it  is  the  easiest  thing  in  the  world 
for  Vienna  and  Berlin  to  supplement  each 
other,  with  great  advantage  to  both. 
"We,"  he  says,  addressing  himself  to  Aus- 
trians,  "have  more  horsepower,  and  you 
more  music.  We  think  more  in  terms  of 
quantity,  the  best  of  you  rather  in  terms 
of  quality.  If  we  can  fuse  our  respective 
abilities,  then  and  for  the  first  time  what 
is  harsh  in  modern  German  civilization  will 

51 


acquire  through  your  assistance  the  touch 
of  charm  which  will  make  it  tolerable  to 
the  outside  world."  How  simple  a  process 
this  fusion  ( "zusammengiessen" )  appears 
to  be  in  the  delightful  vagueness  of  Herr 
Naumann's  pages ! 

And  even  if  Austrians  and  Germans  al- 
low themselves  to  be  carried  away  by  such 
glittering  phrases,  the  sober-minded  Hun- 
garians may  in  due  time  be  trusted  to  look 
at  the  situation  after  the  war  with  a  keen 
eye  to  their  own  interests.  The  Magyars 
have  never  fully  relished  the  union  with 
Austria,  and,  no  matter  what  their  present 
attitude  may  be,  they  will  never  allow  the 
Dual  Monarchy  to  enter  into  any  scheme 
that  may  threaten  to  interfere  with  their 
future  freedom  of  action.  Herr  Naumann 
assumes  that  under  German  influence  the 
plains  of  Hungary  will  become  much 
more  productive.  They  may,  indeed,  but 
how  will  that  influence  be  exerted  without 
wounding  the  susceptibilities  of  the  proud 
Magyars?  Already  we  hear  of  fierce  pro- 
tests in  the  Hungarian  Diet  against  the  in- 

52 


sclent  interference  of  German  purchasers 
of  Hungarian  farms.  Will  the  Hun- 
garian peasantry  be  less  resentful  after  the 
war?  Count  Szechenyi,  "the  greatest 
Magyar,"  as  he  is  sometimes  called  by  his 
countrymen,  said  in  the  Diet  of  1843: 
"How  does  a  nation  come  to  possess  the 
force  and  virtue  necessary  for  its  political 
action?  If  the  majority  of  the  individuals 
composing  it  are  to  fulfil  humanely  and 
honorably  their  appointed  task,  they  must 
acquire,  above  all,  the  art  of  pleasing,  the 
faculty  of  attracting  and  absorbing  the 
neighboring  elements.  Is  it  likely  that  a 
people  will  possess  this  faculty  who  will 
not  respect  in  others  that  which  it  insists 
on  having  respected  in  itself?  It  is  a  great 
art  to  know  how  to  win  men's  hearts." 
Unless  the  Prussians  of  Central  Europe 
shall  draw  the  Magyars  to  their  hearts 
more  easily  than  they  have  drawn  to  them- 
selves their  South-German  brothers,  the 
future  of  Central  Europe  must  remain  du- 
bious. 

A  mere  hint  at  the  numberless  problems 
which  would  confront  the  Slavs  of  Hun- 

53 


gary  and  Cisleithania  under  the  scheme  of 
a  Central  Europe  must  suffice.  A 
strengthening  of  German  influence,  in 
whatever  shape,  and  however  disguised, 
must  inevitably  entail  a  weakening  of 
Slavic  power,  and  such  a  scheme  will  there- 
fore arouse  suspicion  and  resentment 
among  the  Slavs  within  Central  Europe. 
The  mutual  relations  of  other  nationalities 
that  will  be  asked  to  join  Germany,  Heir 
Naumann  conveniently  ignores.  Rumania, 
for  instance,  may  or  may  not  disappear 
from  the  map  of  Europe  as  a  consequence 
of  the  war;  in  either  case,  will  the  Rumans 
of  Hungary  be  better  satisfied  to  remain 
under  Magyar  rule,  with  German  over- 
lordship,  than  they  have  been  hitherto? 
Will  the  Magyars  themselves  be  more 
kindly  disposed  towards  them?  Will  the 
Ruthenes  of  Galicia  dislike  the  Poles 
less,  and  love  the  Teutons  more,  in  a  new 
superstate?  But  everything  seems  to  fit 
into  Herr  Naumann's  scheme.  Yet, 
though  Bulgarians  and  Serbs  may  be  only 
Slavs  to  him,  and  therefore  destined  to  be 
thrown  into  a  common  melting-pot,  their 

54 


national  characteristics  and  differences  will 
outlast  the  war.  The  Bulgarians  are  a 
practical  and  energetic  people,  not  given 
to  boasting  of  their  ancestry,  like  the 
Serbs.  They  may,  or  may  not,  have  made 
a  mistake  in  casting  in  their  lot  with  the 
Teutons,  but  their  future  still  lies  largely 
in  their  own  hands.  They  may  desert 
Germany,  as  they  have  deserted  Russia. 
What  will  be  the  feeling  of  the  Serbs  of 
Hungary  towards  Germany?  Each  Bal- 
kan race  will  survive  the  war  at  least  to 
the  extent  of  being  able  to  plague  its 
neighbors.  And  who  can  foretell  whither, 
in  the  readjustment  of  Europe  after  the 
peace,  the  force  of  a  former  Pan-Slavism 
will  tend?  Will  Poles,  Serbs,  and  Bui- 
gars  fraternize  under  the  common  eegis 
of  a  Central  Europe?  A  stroke  of  the 
pen  has  resuscitated  the  ancient  Kingdom 
of  Poland — with  the  status  of  Galicia  and 
Posen  still  undefined — but  the  fortunes 
of  war  may  wipe  it  off  the  scrap  of  paper 
on  which  the  two  Emperors  signed  their 
edict. 

55 


So  far  the  war  has  settled  nothing, 
though  what  the  rule  of  blood  and  iron 
can  accomplish,  Germany  under  Prussian 
rule  has  accomplished.  Prussian  generals 
have  won  new  glory  for  Prussian  military 
efficiency.  But  in  proportion  as  they  have 
succeeded,  they  have  sown  the  seeds  of 
envy  and  dislike  in  the  rest  of  Germany 
and  in  Austria-Hungary.  Political  prog- 
nostications of  writers  and  statesmen  and 
even  Imperial  rescripts  have  turned  out 
poor  prophecies  before  this.  Naumann 
sees  in  the  Germany  of  to-day  a  "half- 
fmished  product,"  but  Central  Europe  is 
to  develop  somehow  the  fairest  flower  of 
modern  civilization — "a  type  of  man  in- 
termediate between  Frenchmen,  Italians, 
Turks,  Russians,  Scandinavians,  and 
Englishmen" — and  all  this  is  to  "grow 
around  Teutonism."  Such  is  the  fabric  of 
his  dream. 

At  bottom,  stripped  of  all  its  fine 
phrases,  Herr  Naumann's  gospel  of  the 
great  transformation  is  the  old  familiar 
one  of  coercion — friendly  coercion,  by  open 
flattery  and  half -veiled  insinuation,  but  still 

56 


coercion.  He  admits  that  for  Austria- 
Hungary  to  enter  the  Central  European 
combination  will  involve  "a  certain  sacri- 
fice— not  to  be  regarded  lightly — of  econo- 
mic independence  and  of  her  rights  as  a 
free  state"  (her  "staatsrechtliche  Unge- 
bundenheit" ) ,  but,  he  finally  says  in  cold 
blood,  "the  transaction  is  necessary,  ac- 
cording to  all  teaching  of  history,  to  the 
further  continuance  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Dual  Monarchy." 

And  the  continuance  of  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy  is  in  doubt  because  in  the  chain 
of  his  reasoning  the  continuance  of  wars 
is  impliedly  assumed  as  axiomatic.  Free 
as  he  is  from  the  chauvinism  of  a  Bern- 
hardi  or  a  Reventlow,  there  is  no  proof,  in 
his  plea  for  a  Central  Europe,  that  he  be- 
lieves in  the  march  of  political  progress, 
in  the  humanizing  and  liberalizing  in- 
fluences that  are  already  at  work  in  other 
countries  to  make  further  wars  impossible, 
or  at  least  more  difficult  than  hitherto.  He 
no  more  reads  the  thought  of  the  best  ele- 
ments of  Germany  than  he  understands  the 
inmost  feelings  of  Austria-Hungary — not 

57 


to  speak  of  England,  France,  and 
America.  But  though  the  mind  of  Prussia 
may  remain  unchanged  after  the  war, 
must  we  assume  that  the  soul  of  German- 
Austrians,  Magyars,  and  Slavs  is  bound 
to  undergo  a  complete  transformation? 


58 


Austria's  Opportunity 

[From  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  March  31,  1917.] 

XT  EVER  before  in  the  troubled  history 
•*-^  of  the  Monarchy  have  the  perplexi- 
ties of  the  Hapsburg  rulers  been  so  great 
as  now.  Internally  and  externally,  Aus- 
tria-Hungary is  beset  by  apparently  in- 
soluble problems.  In  all  parts  of  the  Em- 
pire there  is  distress,  dissatisfaction, 
divided  council.  To  cap  the  climax,  the 
question  of  a  break  with  the  United  States 
now  looms  up  portentously.  In  Cisleith- 
ania  the  subject  is  being  approached  with 
the  caution  imposed  by  the  censor ;  in  Hun- 
gary, however,  there  is  greater  freedom 
of  speech.  Magyar  papers  have  repeated- 
ly pointed  out  the  folly  of  antagonizing  a 
country  which  plays  so  large  a  part  in 
Hungary's  economic  life.  In  thousands  of 
Hungarian  homes  the  only  means  of  sus- 
tenance comes  from  the  United  States. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  more  than  fifty  mil- 
lion dollars  is  sent  annually  by  Austro- 
Hungarian  subjects  and  naturalized 

59 


Americans  of  Austro-Hungarian  birth  to 
relatives  in  the  Empire,  twenty-five  mil- 
lions alone  coming  from  Slovak  miners  in 
Pennsylvania  and  elsewhere.  How  can 
Austria  under  present  conditions  face  the 
cessation  of  such  a  revenue?  And  this 
question  opens  up  the  larger  one  of  the 
origin  and  the  issue  of  the  war. 

More  and  more  frequently,  in  Austria 
as  in  Hungary,  people  are  asking,  what 
have  we  to  gain  by  continuing  the  war? 
The  promises  held  out  by  the  Hohenzol- 
lern  to  the  Hapsburg  before  the  fatal  ulti- 
matum to  Servia,  have  long  since  lost  their 
potency.  The  new  Emperor  and  his  ad- 
visers are  disillusioned,  the  people  weary 
and  half -starved.  The  political  outlook  in 
all  the  Austrian  crown  lands,  with  the 
possible  exception  of  Galicia,  is  dreary 
in  the  extreme.  Every  semblance  of 
constitutional  government  has  disap- 
peared in  the  Austrian  half  of  the 
Empire.  The  Vienna  Reichsrat  has 
not  been  convoked  in  three  years.  The 
Czechs,  whom  the  Emperor  had  hoped 
to  conciliate  by  the  appointment  of  Count 

60 


Clam-Martinitz  as  Austrian  Premier, 
branded  the  Minister  as  a  renegade;  in 
Hungary  the  opposition  to  the  pro-Ger- 
man policy  of  Tisza  is  becoming  more  and 
more  pronounced.  The  Hungarian  Pre- 
mier is  held  responsible,  jointly  with  the 
German  Chancellor,  for  the  disastrous 
failure  of  the  German  peace  proposal. 
Count  Andrassy,  the  leader  of  the  Consti- 
tutionalists ;  Counts  Apponyi  and  Karolyi, 
the  leaders  of  the  two  Independence  par- 
ties ;  ex-Premier,  Dr.  Alexander  Wekerle, 
and  other  influential  men — some  in  the 
ranks  of  the  Democratic  party — are  un- 
dermining the  position  of  the  formerly  all- 
powerful  Tisza,  and  with  his  fall  Hohen- 
zollern  influence  in  the  councils  of  the 
Hapsburg  monarchy  will  have  received  a 
deadly  blow. 

Throughout  the  war  Germany's  efforts 
to  Teutonize  Hungary  have  been  keenly 
resented  by  the  proud  Magyars.  In  the 
Diet  the  insolence  of  German  purchasers 
of  Hungarian  estates  has  provoked  bitter 
discussion  and  the  propagandist  visits  of 
two  leading  German  politicians,  Herr 
61 


Bassermann  and  Count  Westarp,  to  the 
Hungarian  capital,  have  been  sarcastical- 
ly commented  upon  by  the  Budapest  press. 
Thus  the  Nepszava  said:  "German  Kul- 
tur  is  sufficiently  well  represented  in  Hun- 
gary to  make  it  unnecessary  to  found 
any  fresh  associations  for  its  dissemina- 
tion." Conversely,  German  newspapers 
have  complained  of  the  intolerant  attitude 
of  the  Hungarians.  The  Munich  Neueste 
Nachrichten  deplores  the  inability  of  the 
Magyars  to  appreciate  the  purely  cultural 
efforts  of  Germany,  and  revives  the  old 
charge  of  Magyar  oppression  of  other 
nationalities. 

The  fact  is,  the  Hungarians  are,  as  they 
have  always  been,  an  intensely  practical 
people,  and  they  will  not  compromise  their 
future  for  the  sake  of  pleasing  either 
Hohenzollern  or  Hapsburg.  The  bait  of 
becoming  the  guardians  of  the  grain  em- 
porium in  the  post-bellum  Central  Eu- 
rope has  been  spurned  by  clear-sighted 
Magyar  statesmen,  and  though  Hungary 
has  gone  far  enough  in  following  German 

62 


leadership,  there  are  indications  that  she 
will  not  go  the  full  length  of  Hohenzollern 
desires. 

Least  of  all  will  the  Germans  of  Cis- 
leithania  be  entrapped  into  approval  of  the 
last  mad  scheme  of  Hohenzollern  states- 
manship— open  defiance  of  the  United 
States.  During  the  fifty  years  that  have 
elapsed  since  the  Compromise  with  Hun- 
gary the  balance  of  power  within  Cis- 
leithania  has  inclined,  now  to  the  German 
elements — liberal  or  conservative — now  to 
the  Czechs  or  Poles;  but  through  it  all 
Vienna  has  remained  the  centre  of  the  Em- 
pire. German- Austria  still  rules  the  rul- 
ers, if  not  the  Monarchy.  The  new  Em- 
peror reflects,  like  Francis  Joseph,  the 
feeling  of  Vienna,  and  this  is,  and  ever  has 
been,  antagonistic  to  Berlin.  Vienna, 
even  before  the  war,  retained  much  of  its 
old  dislike  of  Prussian  ways,  and  Berlin 
reciprocated  this  feeling.  What  an  acute 
student  of  Kulturgeschichte,  Wilhelm 
Heinrich  Riehl,  wrote  half  a  century  ago 
concerning  the  relations  of  Vienna  and 
Berlin  is  still  largely  true: 

63 


"As  regards  mutual  depreciation  and 
lack  of  understanding,  North  and  South 
Germans  stand  on  the  same  level.  There 
are  enough  educated  people  in  the  North, 
travellers  in  many  lands,  who  almost  glory 
in  the  fact  that  they  have  never  seen  Vi- 
enna; just  as  there  are  such  in  the  South 
who  are  proud  of  having  always  avoided 
going  to  the  capital  on  the  Spree." 

In  German  literature,  down  to  compara- 
tively recent  days,  depreciation  of  Aus- 
trian writers  was  the  rule  rather  than  the 
exception.  "Grillparzer,"  wrote  a  North 
German  critic,  "is  an  Austrian  poet  who 
happens  not  to  have  written  in  the  Magyar 
or  Czech  tongue,  but  in  German.  His 
works  cannot  be  considered  as  manifesta- 
tions of  the  German  spirit."  In  a  sense 
this  was  true  enough,  for  Grillparzer  was 
an  Austrian  in  every  fibre,  and  disliked 
Prussian  arrogance  and  pedantry  intense- 
ly. Nor  was  the  dramatist  the  only  Ger- 
man-Austrian writer  thoroughly  repre- 
sentative of  the  Austrian  spirit  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  Prussian.  Lenau, 
Raimund,  Rosegger,  and  Anzenzruber 

64 


are  notable  instances  of  this  in  literature, 
as  were  Mozart,  Schubert,  Haydn,  and 
Johann  Strauss  in  music,  and  Schwind  in 
art. 

Vienna  and  Berlin,  though  ostensibly 
united,  are  in  reality  far  apart.  Austria 
has  not  forgotten  the  series  of  humiliations 
suffered  for  a  century  and  more  at  the 
hands  of  the  Hohenzollerns.  Bismarck's 
policy,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of 
his  career,  was  one  long,  carefully 
wrought-out  plan  for  destroying  Austrian 
influence,  first  in  the  German  Federation, 
and  then  in  all  Europe.  A  hundred  frank- 
ly cynical  pages  in  his  Memoirs  bear  this 
out.  And  only  two  years  ago  one  of  Bis- 
marck's successors  labored  hard  to  barter 
away  some  of  Austria's  fairest  provinces 
for  Italy's  promise  to  keep  out  of  the  war. 

As  was  Austria,  so  were  Bavaria, 
Saxony,  and  other  German  states  but 
pawns  in  Prussia's  game.  Bismarck  had 
them  all  in  mind  when  he  wrote,  in  1859, 
to  Minister  von  Schleinitz  of  that  "infirm- 
ity of  Prussia's"  which  could  only  be 
healed  ferro  et  igni.  Fire  and  sword  are 
65 


once  more  the  motto  of  Prussian  states- 
manship, but  Prussia,  now  the  arbiter  of 
the  fate  of  all  Germany,  has  still  to  reckon 
with  her  "faithful  ally."  Austria  stands 
at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  Her  alliance 
with  the  Hohenzollern,  forced  upon  her 
by  fancied  political  necessity,  is  not  based 
on  inner  kinship  in  thought  and  feeling, 
not  on  ancient  historical  tradition,  nor  on 
community  of  future  interests.  It  is  a  hol- 
low pretence,  rife  with  the  seeds  of  future 
dissension.  When  the  break  between 
Hohenzollern  and  Hapsburg  will  come,  it 
would  be  rash  to  predict,  but  that  the  pres- 
ent union  will  not  outlast  the  war  is  cer- 
tain. The  tone  of  the  last  Austrian  note 
to  our  Government  portends  unmistakably 
a  change  in  the  relations  between  the  Teu- 
tonic Powers.  Whatever  Germany  may 
decide  upon  in  her  delusion,  Austria  can- 
not risk  the  severance  of  her  relations  with 
the  United  States. 


66 


The  Future  of  Bohemia 

[From  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  May  16,  1917.] 

Bohemia  is  declared  to  be  in  a  state  of 
siege.  What  does  the  news  portend  for 
the  future  of  the  kingdom  and  the  entire 
Hapsburg  monarchy?  Are  the  prospects 
of  peace  brought  nearer  by  this  emphatic 
evidence  of  civic  strife  in  the  most  import- 
ant crownland  of  Cisleithania?  A  possible 
answer  to  such  questions  concerning  the 
future  may  be  sought  in  a  retrospect  of 
the  past. 

"Whoever  is  master  of  Bohemia  is  mas- 
ter of  Europe,"  said  Bismarck.  He  had 
in  mind,  not  the  nominal  rulership,  but 
the  mastery  of  problems  which  from  the 
time  of  the  fall  of  the  great  Moravian  em- 
pire, about  the  year  900,  have  never  ceased 
to  trouble  Europe.  Throughout  her  per- 
turbations Bohemia  has  within  the  past 
century  grown  economically  to  a  com- 
manding position  in  Austria  and  Europe. 
Agriculturally  and  industrially  highly 
productive,  with  enormously  rich  coal  de- 

67 


posits  and  the  most  famous  mineral 
springs  in  the  world,  Bohemia,  "the  pearl 
in  the  crown  of  St.  Wenceslas,"  enjoys  in- 
deed a  proud  preeminence.  For  centuries, 
too,  Bohemia  has  been  prominent  in  the 
arts  of  peace.  The  Czech  nation  gave 
Comenius  (Komensky)  to  the  world,  and 
in  more  recent  times  Bohemia  has  been 
one  of  the  artistic  centres  of  Europe. 
Gluck  conducted  his  first  operas  in  Prague 
and  Mozart's  Don  Juan  first  saw  there  the 
light. 

Down  to  the  close  of  the  eighteenth 
century  Europe  was  but  little  concerned 
in  the  destinies  of  Bohemia.  Since  then 
the  awakened  national  aspirations  of  the 
Czechs,  amid  the  general  revival  of  Slav- 
dom, have  drawn  the  attention  of  foreign 
observers  to  a  long-neglected  subject.  And 
now  the  note  of  the  Entente  Powers,  with 
its  implied  promise  of  the  restoration  of 
the  realm  of  Bohemia,  which  came  to  an 
end  in  1620,  fixes  the  gaze  of  all  the  world 
upon  the  Austrian  province  seemingly 
destined  to  play  an  important  part  in  the 
final  settlement  of  the  war.  "A  great  em- 

68 


pire,  like  a  great  cake,"  says  Franklin, 
"is  most  easily  diminished  at  the  edges." 
Naturally  enough,  certain  Czech  pa- 
triots and  agitators  have  sought  by  every 
means  at  their  command  to  use  the  pres- 
ent opportunity  to  undermine  the  hold  of 
the  Hapsburgs  on  their  North  Slavic  do- 
minions. The  realm  of  St.  Wenceslas  is 
to  be  restored,  but  how  is  the  dream  to  be 
realized?  The  advocates  of  the  plan 
picture  to  themselves  a  country  consisting 
of  Bohemia  proper,  Moravia,  and  Silesia, 
plus  the  Slovak  districts  of  northern  Hun- 
gary, the  whole  to  comprise  about  50,000 
square  miles,  and  to  contain  about  12,- 
000,000  inhabitants.  The  English  trans- 
lation of  the  Entente  note  spoke  of  the  lib- 
eration of  the  "Czecho- Slovaks,"  instead 
of  the  "Czechs  and  Slovaks"  (as  the 
French  original  had  it),  but  the  resusci- 
tation of  Bohemia  as  an  independent  na- 
tion, with  "Slovakia"  as  an  integral  part, 
has  not  in  any  quarter  been  clearly  form- 
ulated. In  a  matter  of  such  importance 
the  details  are  everything.  "Slovakia" 
has  had  no  political  existence  since  the 

69 


tenth  century,  and  its  present  limits,  hav- 
ing reference  only  to  the  regions  of  Hun- 
gary where  Slovaks  predominate,  are  not 
easily  defined.  It  is  admitted  by  those 
who  favor  the  incorporation  of  Slovakia 
that  not  all  her  children  in  Hungary  can 
return  to  the  fold.  The  fate  of  the  Slo- 
vaks in  other  parts  of  Hungary  than  those 
which  are  to  be  merged  in  the  new  Bo- 
hemia is  left  in  doubt;  nor  do  we  get  the 
slightest  hint  as  to  the  status  of  the  Mag- 
yars who  will  find  themselves  incorporated 
in  the  new  state,  together  with  the  Slovaks. 
The  forced  consent  of  the  Hungarian 
nation  to  the  cession  of  their  northern  ter- 
ritory is,  of  course,  assumed,  just  as  is  the 
consent  of  the  Government  of  Cisleithania 
to  the  liberation  of  all  Bohemia.  What 
is  to  be  the  form  of  government  to  be 
adopted  for  the  new  state?  On  the 
whole,  a  monarchy  seems  to  be  preferred, 
though  some  advocates  of  total  separation 
from  Austria  incline  to  a  republican  form 
of  government. 

Prof.  T.  G.  Masaryk,  formerly  of  the 
University  of  Prague,  and  now  an  exile 

70 


in  London,  passes  lightly  over  the  ques- 
tion of  the  constitution  of  the  new  Bo- 
hemia. Writing  in  the  New  Europe, 
shortly  before  the  establishment  of  the 
present  Government  of  Russia,  he  says : 

The  dynastic  question  is  left  to  the  de- 
cision of  the  Allies,  who  might  perhaps 
give  one  of  their  own  princes.  There 
might  be  a  personal  union  between  Servia 
and  Bohemia,  if  the  Serbs  and  Bohemians 
were  to  be  neighboring  countries.  A  per- 
sonal union  with  Russia  or  with  Poland, 
if  the  latter  were  to  be  quite  independent, 
has  also  been  suggested.  (German  and 
Austrian  princes  must  co  ipso  be  ex- 
cluded.) The  Bohemian  people  are  thor- 
oughly Slavophile.  A  Russian  dynasty,  in 
whatever  form,  would  be  most  popular, 
and,  in  any  case,  Bohemian  politicians  de- 
sire the  establishment  of  the  kingdom  of 
Bohemia  in  complete  accord  with  Russia. 

This  is  equalled  in  vagueness  only  by 
the  suggestion  that  "so  far  as  the  Ger- 
man minority  is  concerned,  I  should  not 
be  opposed  to  a  rectification  of  the  politi- 
cal frontier;  parts  of  Bohemia  and  Mo- 
ravia, where  there  are  only  a  few  Czechs, 
might  be  ceded  to  German  Austria."  We 

71 


must  remember  that  in  present  Bohemia 
the  proportion  of  Germans  to  Czechs  is 
as  thirty-seven  to  sixty-three,  and  that 
the  German  minority,  so  nonchalantly  to 
be  disposed  of,  contains  most  of  the  me- 
chanical and  technological  skill,  enterprise, 
and  wealth,  that  Bohemia  boasts.  More- 
over, there  is  nothing  in  the  history  of  the 
kingdom,  remote  or  recent,  to  warrant  the 
assumption  of  future  harmony  between  the 
common  people  and  the  aristocracy — a 
very  important  consideration  in  the  case 
of  a  country  where  noble  families  have  per- 
haps greater  power  and  influence  than  has 
any  other  aristocracy  in  Europe.  The 
feudal  nobility  of  Bohemia  has  never 
identified  itself  with  the  people — German 
or  Czech — as  has  the  Magyar  aristocracy 
with  the  masses  of  Hungary.  The  Princes 
Schwarzenberg  own  one-thirteenth  of  the 
land;  the  Lobkowitzes,  Clam-Martinitzes, 
and  many  other  noblemen  ranged  on  the 
side  of  the  feudalists  are  scarcely  less  in- 
fluential than  the  Schwarzenbergs.  Gen- 
erally opposed  to  the  feudalists  in  political 
matters  involving  the  equality  of  the 

72 


Czech  and  German  languages,  but  equally 
aloof  from  the  masses,  are  the  Princes 
Auersperg  and  other  German-speaking 
landed  proprietors,  whom  the  new  Bo- 
hemia will  find  it  anything  but  easy  to 
dispossess  or  expatriate.  And  not  only 
Bohemian  noblemen  of  both  nationalities 
have  hitherto  been  attached  to  the  house 
of  Hapsburg,  but  the  bulk  of  the  Czech 
people  have  been  distinctly  loyal  on  vari- 
ous critical  occasions.  That  a  cataclysm 
like  the  present  war  has  led  to  something 
like  revolt,  both  in  the  army  and  in  civil 
life,  is  explainable  enough  on  purely 
economic  grounds.  Up  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  the  most  fervent  of  Czech 
nationalists  have  acquiesced  in  the  over- 
lordship  of  the  Hapsburgs,  and  clamored 
only  for  an  autonomy  of  Bohemia  like 
that  which  Hungary  enjoys,  within  the 
monarchy.  That  the  Hapsburg  regime, 
with  rare  exceptions,  has  on  the  whole 
consistently  opposed  the  political  and 
literary  aspirations  of  Czech  leaders  has 
not  disturbed  the  vision  of  those  among 
them  clear-sighted  enough  to  recognize 

73 


that  an  independent  state  of  Bohemia 
would  mean  a  Bohemia  exposed  to  the 
ambitions  of  neighboring  states  and  the 
entanglements  of  European  politics. 

The  principal  spokesman  for  Czech 
aspirations  in  the  last  century,  the  his- 
torian, Francis  Palacky,  a  patriot  of  great 
renown,  is  credited  with  the  authorship 
of  the  dictum  that  "if  Austria  did  not 
exist  it  would  have  to  be  invented." 
Palacky  wrote  as  late  as  1865:  "To  pre- 
tend that  the  resources  of  so  vast  an  Em- 
pire are  to  be  devoted  entirely  to  the 
service  of  one  or  two  favorite  peoples, 
while  the  others  who  contribute  equally  to 
the  might  of  the  whole  estate  are  to  be 
content  with  what  may  be  allowed  them, 
is  equal  to  saying:  'We  are  the  masters 
and  you  are  the  servants.' '  It  is  true, 
Palacky's  argument  was  directed  against 
the  Germans  of  Bohemia,  but  he  was  too 
good  a  logician  not  to  know  that  his 
reasoning  could  be  turned  both  ways. 
"The  Slavs,"  he  declared,  "desire  the 
prosperity  of  the  monarchy,  on  condition 
that  they  are  given  guarantees  for  their 

74 


normal  development."  He  feared — not 
hoped — that  the  Dualism  established  in 
1867  portended  the  eventual  dismember- 
ment of  the  monarchy. 

Another  fallacy  in  the  reasoning  of  those 
who  would  identify  Pan- Slavic  aims  with 
present  Czech  aspirations  is  the  assump- 
tion that  Bohemians  have  always  been 
wishing  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  the 
kindred  races  of  Austria  and  other 
countries.  The  truth  is  that  the  Czechs 
of  Bohemia  have  had  but  a  tempered 
sympathy  with  the  aspirations  of  other 
Slavic  peoples.  The  idea  of  a  Pan-Slavic 
union  occurred  to  Kollar,  generally  con- 
sidered the  father  of  the  movement,  mainly 
for  literary  purposes.  He  first  advanced 
the  plan  in  1831,  and,  of  course,  from 
that  the  step  to  a  furtherance  of  political 
aims  was  a  natural  one.  During  the  revo- 
lution of  1848  the  Bohemians,  while  tak- 
ing the  leadership  in  the  Slavic  movement 
which  then  seemed  to  promise  success, 
were  far  apart  from  several  of  their  Slavic 
brethren.  The  general  Slavic  congress 
convoked  by  Palacky  at  Prague  resulted 

75 


in  a  split  into  two  camps.  The  Czechs  de- 
clared in  favor  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment, as  did  the  South-Slavic  Croats  and 
Serbs.  The  Poles,  who  had  learned  to 
see  in  the  Russians  their  natural  oppres- 
sors, espoused  the  cause  of  Hungary. 
Pan- Slavism  is  to  day  as  little  of  a  practi- 
cal fact  as  it  was  during  the  revolution  of 
1848. 

It  never  entered  Palacky's  mind  that  the 
revival  of  the  Czech  language  meant  the 
creation  of  a  Czecho- Slovak  state.  Up  to 
about  1850  he  and  a  few  scholars  like 
Schafarik  represented  all  that  there  was 
in  Czech  literature,  in  the  creation  of  which 
he  was  chiefly  interested.  It  is  told  of 
him  that  when  he  and  a  small  number  of 
his  friends  gathered  at  his  house  on  one 
occasion  he  remarked  jestingly:  "If  the 
roof  should  now  fall,  the  whole  of  Czech 
literature  would  be  buried  in  its  ruins." 
Nevertheless,  the  stimulus  given  to  Czech 
aims  by  the  present  war  is  not  surprising, 
and,  properly  expressed  and  led  into  prac- 
tical channels,  it  may  lead  to  important 
results.  Austria  is  on  the  verge  of  ex- 

76 


haustion,  and  after  laying  her  heavy  hand 
on  Czech  "rebels"  like  Dr.  Kramarsch,  the 
Government  may  even  before  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace  be  forced  to  gentler  measures 
in  dealing  with  her  recalcitrant  subjects 
in  Bohemia.  Possibly  the  leaders  of  the 
present  movement  among  the  Czechs,  as 
well  as  the  European  statesmen  eventually 
charged  with  peace  negotiations,  may 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  an  autonomous 
Bohemia  within  the  Empire  may  be  a 
stronger  guarantee  of  future  peace  to  all 
concerned  than  a  nominally  free  Bohemia 
without.  One  thing,  at  all  events,  is  cer- 
tain. The  Czechs  of  Bohemia  will  never 
lend  a  willing  ear  to  Pan-German  bland- 
ishments. They  may  make  peace,  in  their 
own  interest,  with  the  Hapsburgs  but  they 
will  never  cease  to  distrust  the  Hohenzol- 
lerns.  They  still  feel  towards  German 
chauvinism  as  they  did  in  the  day  when 
Ladislas  Rieger,  Palacky's  son-in-law  and 
the  most  eloquent  spokesman  of  his  peo- 
ple, said  in  a  famous  discourse:  "You  al- 
ways talk  of  German  science  and  civiliza- 
tion. How  often  have  these  idols  been  held 

77 


up  to  us  for  our  admiration!  One  never 
hears  any  one  talk  of  French  science  and 
civilization,  but  'Deutsche  Wissenschaft'  is 
such  a  mouth-filling  morsel!" 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  at  the  conclusion 
of  peace  the  Czechs,  like  the  Poles,  may 
be  masters  of  their  destinies,  but  it  is  pre- 
mature to  forecast  their  decision.  Austria 
in  her  strength  and  her  weakness — her  di- 
versified German  and  non-German  ma- 
terial and  intellectual  interests,  as  well  as 
her  hopeless  internal  dissensions — is  to-day 
the  greatest  stumbling  block  in  the  path  of 
Germany's  single-minded  ruthlessness. 
Pan-Germanism,  always  confined  in 
Lower  Austria  to  a  handful  of  noisy  dema- 
gogues, has  made  no  converts  since  the 
war.  Vienna  is  not  yet  ready  to  sink  to 
the  level  of  a  lesser  Berlin.  And  all  Aus- 
tria will  long  remember  that  Prussia  lured 
her  into  the  present  war  and,  when  hos- 
tilities were  scarcely  begun,  brought  every 
pressure  to  bear  upon  her  to  make  her 
relinquish  some  of  her  fairest  provinces 
for  the  sake  of  keeping  Italy  from  joining 
the  Allies.  -  Such  an  alliance  in  arms  has 

78 


taught  Austria  what  to  expect  in  a  future 
partnership  in  "Central  Europe."  It  will 
be  the  task  of  wise  statesmanship  among 
the  Allies  to  reconcile  the  claims  of  the 
Czechs  with  the  position  of  Austria  as  an 
important  factor  in  eventual  combinations 
that  shall  bring  about  peace  and  save  the 
world  from  future  aggression  on  the  part 
of  Germany. 


79 


Hungary  and  the  Fall  of 
Tisza 

[From  The  New  York  Nation,  May  31,  1917.] 

HP  HE  resignation  of  the  Tisza  Ministry 
is  an  event  the  significance  of  which 
will  be  felt  on  all  the  battlefields  of  En- 
rope.  Exactly  fifty  years  after  the  re- 
gained autonomy  of  Hungary  was  sealed 
by  the  coronation  of  Francis  Joseph  at 
Budapest,  his  successor  to  the  crown  of 
St.  Stephen  parts  with  the  services  of  the 
Premier  who  has  been  the  most  powerful 
advocate  of  the  alliance  between  the 
Hohenzollerns  and  the  Hapsburgs.  Count 
Tisza  had  staked  his  fate  on  the  unshaken 
continuance  of  that  alliance,  and  he  has 
fallen.  Ostensibly  he  resigned  because  the 
Emperor  Charles  refused  to  approve  of 
his  attitude  concerning  the  reform  of  the 
franchise  in  the  Hungarian  kingdom,  and 
it  may  well  be  that  the  voice  of  the  various 
nationalities  who  are  clamoring  for  a  juster 
share  in  the  Government  than  the  Magyars 

81 


have  hitherto  accorded  them  can  no  longer 
be  suppressed;  but  more  serious  problems 
are  confronting  both  halves  of  the  mon- 
archy to-day  than  even  the  question  of  uni- 
versal manhood  suffrage  in  Hungary. 

Public  opinion  in  Hungary  is  divided 
on  the  question  of  continuing  the  war. 
We  have  heard  of  Count  Karolyi,  the 
leader  of  a  branch  of  the  Independence 
party,  strongly  urging  the  need  of  peace 
and  repudiating  all  ideas  of  conquest ;  and 
of  such  influential  papers  as  the  Pesti 
Hirlap  and  the  Pesti  Naplo  (once  famous 
as  the  organ  of  Francis  Deak)  ranging 
themselves  on  the  side  of  the  opposition  to 
Tisza.  Finally,  there  came  the  cable  news 
of  a  bitter  attack  of  the  Pesti  Naplo  on 
Count  Reventlow  and  of  the  Socialist 
organ,  Nepszava.,  on  Tirpitz,  while  three 
members  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  were 
quoted  as  condemning  the  present  subma- 
rine warfare. 

Little  has  been  heard  during  the  war  of 

the  once  powerful  Kossuth  party.     Its 

very  name  has  been  merged  in  that  of  other 

groups,  but  that  its  principles  will  revive 

82 


after  the  war  is  as  certain  as  that  the  spell 
of  that  famous  leader  has  not  forever  lost 
its  potency.  How  will  his  teachings  com- 
port with  the  new  order  of  things  in  Hun- 
gary if  the  Pan-Germanists  and  advocates 
of  a  new  Central  Europe  have  their  way? 
Can  Magyars  ever  forget  his  fierce  detes- 
tation of  the  Hapsburgs,  his  glowing  ad- 
miration for  Anglo-Saxons?  "It  is  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race  alone,"  he  said,  in  an 
address  in  this  country  on  March  6,  1852, 
"that  stands  high  and  erect  in  its  inde- 
pendence. .  .  .  And  inviolability  of 
person  and  the  inviolability  of  property 
are  English  principles.  England  is  the 
last  stronghold  of  these  principles  in  Eu- 
rope." And  contrast  with  this  his  remark 
about  Prussia,  on  a  similar  occasion: 
"What  would  the  petty  princes  of  Ger- 
many have  been  in  1848  without  Prussia? 
And  what  was  Prussia,  when  her  capital 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  people,  without 
the  certainty  of  the  Czar's  support?" 

Tisza,  who  returned  to  power  as  Premier 
in  1913,  after  having  been  in  the  Cabinet 
from  1903  to  1906,  has  been  the  subject 

83 


of  bitter  opposition  both  before  and  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  He  resumed 
office  after  Prime  Minister  Lukacs  had 
introduced,  in  1912,  a  franchise  bill  the 
provisions  of  which  would  have  doubled 
the  electorate,  but  which  still  left  the  fa- 
vored classes  with  so  many  privileges  that 
the  Radical  party  and  the  Socialists  raised 
a  fierce  outcry  against  the  Government's 
proposal.  Tisza,  who  was  then  President 
of  the  Chamber,  was  the  principal  target 
of  abuse,  and  after  he  became  Premier  he 
had  to  face  a  new  Opposition  party,  or- 
ganized by  Count  Andrassy,  who  was,  and 
has  since  been,  committed  to  the  reform  of 
the  franchise.  Tisza  declared  universal 
suffrage  to  be  a  national  danger.  He  not 
unnaturally  feared  that  the  political  equal- 
ity of  the  various  nationalities  of  Hungary 
would  threaten  Magyar  hegemony.  But 
the  exigencies  of  war  lead  to  strange 
avowals  and  disavowals.  Tisza  recently 
seemed  to  experience  a  sudden  change  of 
heart  and  professed  in  Parliament  his  af- 
fection for  the  non-Magyar  races.  "No- 
where in  the  world,"  he  said,  "is  the  prin- 

84 


ciple  of  nationality  applied  so  liberally  as 
in  the  two  states  of  the  Dual  Monarchy." 
These  idyllic  conditions  have  not  always 
prevailed  either  in  Cisleithania  or  in  Hun- 
gary. Few  modern  Magyar  statesmen 
have  consistently  adhered  to  the  principles 
of  Deak  and  Eotvos,  who  labored  honestly 
for  a  conciliatory  policy  towards  non- 
Magyar  nationalities  and  respected  their 
languages  and  customs.  Their  enlight- 
ened views  gave  way  in  the  seventies  to 
the  ruthlessly  chauvinistic  policy  of  the 
elder  Tisza,  and  the  Magyarization  of  the 
state  has  since  gone  on  apace.  The  in- 
tolerance of  the  Government  towards  Par- 
liamentary representatives  of  other  races 
may  be  illustrated  by  an  incident  which 
occurred  last  February.  A  well-known 
Slovak  Deputy,  Father  Juriga,  who  had 
suffered  imprisonment  for  his  nationalist 
principles,  discussed  a  bill  before  the 
Chamber  designed  to  perpetuate  the  mem- 
ory of  the  heroes  who  had  fallen  in  battle. 
In  the  course  of  his  remarks  he  requested 
the  House  to  permit  him  to  read  a  letter 
written  in  the  Slovak  language  by  a  sol- 

85 


dier  who  had  thanked  the  Minister  of  Edu- 
cation for  having  allowed,  during  the  war, 
the  study  of  the  Slovak  language  in 
secondary  schools.  But  after  violent  in- 
terruption on  the  part  of  the  Opposition 
leaders,  the  Chamber  ruled  that  not  a 
single  Slovak  word  could  be  spoken  by 
any  Deputy,  and  Juriga  desisted  from  his 
purpose  with  the  quiet  remark:  "I  do 
not  wish  to  create  a  scandal,  and  therefor^ 
content  myself  with  pointing  out  that  in 
this  House  quotations  may  be  read  in 
English  and  French,  the  languages  of  the 
enemy,  but  not  in  some  of  the  languages 
of  our  own  country." 

The  Germans  within  the  limits  of  Hun- 
gary have  on  the  whole  bowed  more  meek- 
ly to  the  rule  of  the  Magyar  than  the  other 
nationalities.  Indeed,  their  outward  trans- 
formation into  Magyars — the  Saxons  of 
Transylvania  alone  excepted — has  in  the 
large  towns  been  rapid,  and  as  they  had  no 
separatist  aspirations,  there  has  been  little 
political  friction  between  them  and  the 
dominant  race.  German  names  of  places 
have  disappeared  from  school  geographies, 


and  in  many  instances  German  patrony- 
mics have  been  gladly  exchanged  by  their 
bearers  for  more  sonorous  Magyar  ones. 
Yet  the  war  has  not  drawn  Magyars  and 
Teutons  closer  to  each  other.  Officially 
they  may  fraternize,  organically  they  do 
not  fuse.  Hungarian  and  Austrian  gene- 
rals bore  a  distinguished  part  in  the  early 
battles,  when  German  armies  came  to  the 
rescue  of  their  hard-pressed  allies  in  the 
Carpathians  and  elsewhere,  but  the  names 
of  Kovess  and  Boehm-Ermolli  are  never 
mentioned  when  Germans  sing  the  praises 
of  Hindenburg  and  Mackensen.  Nor 
have  the  South  Slavs  of  the  monarchy 
learned  during  the  war  to  look  with  friend- 
lier eyes  on  Berlin  and  Vienna  than  before. 
With  the  fate  of  Servia  as  a  warning  ex- 
ample before  them,  the  loyalty  of  Serbo- 
Croats  to  the  Hapsburgs  and  their  wil- 
lingness to  place  themselves  under  the  aegis 
of  the  Hohenzollerns  have  been  sorely 
tried.  The  Croats  and  Magyars  have  al- 
ways been  at  daggers  drawn.  It  may  be 
taken  as  axiomatic  that  what  the  Magyar 
desires  the  Croat  opposes.  Croatia  has 

87 


never  concealed  its  bitter  discontent  with 
Dualism,  and  Hungarian  politicians  have 
fully  reciprocated  the  feeling  of  the  Croats. 
Recent  utterances  of  the  newspapers  of 
Agram  and  Fiume  that  occasionally  find 
their  way  to  this  country  reflect  the  dis- 
satisfaction of  the  people  with  prevailing 
economic  conditions — a  feeling  which  ex- 
tends to  the  political  situation  as  well. 

Tisza  had  originally  not  been  particu- 
larly friendly  to  the  German  designs  on 
Austria-Hungary,  which  have  found  ex- 
pression in  the  plan  of  a  "Mitteleuropa." 
He  opposed  the  economic  federation  be- 
tween the  Central  Powers  and  those  Eu- 
ropean states  which  Germany  was  espe- 
cially anxious  to  place  under  her  wings. 
In  truth,  he  distrusted  more  than  one 
partner  in  the  future  Central  Europe,  and 
like  all  Magyar  statesmen  of  the  present 
day,  who  seek  in  every  political  combina- 
tion solely  the  interest  of  their  own  race, 
he  thought  of  the  future,  while  the  states- 
men of  Vienna  thought  chiefly  of  the  pres- 
ent. Whether  his  dismissal  from  office 
now  is  due  to  his  own  recognition  of  the 
88 


fact  that  the  alliance  between  Hapsburgs 
and  Hohenzollerns  is  tottering,  or  whether 
the  Emperor  Charles  wishes  to  have  a  free 
hand  in  movements  which  might  find  in  the 
fiery  Hungarian  a  dangerous  opponent, 
Tisza's  fall  presages  in  any  case  an  un- 
mistakable change  in  the  relations  between 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  The  fact 
is  that,  though  the  two  countries  have  been 
politically  united  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  they  have  in  their  military  activity 
since  their  early  common  successes  been 
gradually  drifting  apart.  Germany  is 
fighting  her  battles  in  France  alone,  as 
Austria  is  fighting  hers  in  the  Trentino  and 
the  Coast  Districts.  The  fate  of  the  Mon- 
archy is  nearer  to  the  heart  of  its  ruler 
than  the  future  of  his  German  ally.  As 
for  his  subjects,  they  are  skeptical,  and 
they  were  long  forced  to  remain  silent. 
Previous  experiences  in  their  history  have 
taught  all  the  peoples  of  the  Empire  not 
to  build  their  hopes  too  firmly  on  military 
victories.  In  1866  Austria  humbled  Italy 
in  the  sea-fight  at  Lissa,  and  was  com- 
pelled to  give  up  Venetia  to  her.  She  was 

89 


crushed  at  Sadowa  by  Prussia,  and  Hun- 
gary gained  her  autonomy  and  Cisleithania 
a  liberal  Constitution.  And  to-day,  with 
the  fortunes  of  war  still  in  the  balance, 
Slavs,  Humans,  and  others  look  expectant- 
ly to  a  future  that  shall  bring  them,  some- 
how, through  some  turn  of  affairs  at  home 
or  abroad,  their  coveted  self-government. 

Whoever  may  be  Tisza's  successor,  an 
element  of  unrest  is  now  working  in  the 
Empire  which  is  certain  to  influence  the 
course  of  affairs.  Vienna  has  served  notice 
on  Budapest  that  it  intends  to  become 
once  more  the  centre  of  political  gravity, 
but  whether  the  Government,  with  or  with- 
out the  sanction  of  the  representatives  of 
the  people — it  is  reported  that  for  the  first 
time  in  more  than  three  years  the  Reichs- 
rat  has  been  convened — will  be  able  to 
strike  out  into  new  paths,  internally  as  well 
as  externally,  remains  to  be  seen.  Too  lit- 
tle is  known  of  the  new  Emperor  to  war- 
rant the  assumption  that  he  intends  to  rule 
with  the  help  of  the  liberal  Germans  of 
Austria,  but  he  certainly  cannot  perma- 
nently ignore  them.  Though  ever  since 

90 


the  fall  of  the  Auersperg  Ministry,  in 
1879,  they  have  been  out  of  power,  they 
are  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with.  Their 
voice  is  bound  to  be  heard  again,  and  its 
echoes  will  reach  Berlin.  The  Austrian 
Germans  will  not  forever  follow  whither 
Prussia  shall  lead.  Once  more,  as  so  often 
in  the  past,  the  inherent  antagonism  be- 
tween Austrians  and  Prussians  manifests 
itself.  The  Germans  of  Lower  and  Upper 
Austria,  of  Salzburg,  Styria,  Carinthia, 
the  Tyrol,  and  other  Crown  lands,  who  are 
mostly  of  purer  Teutonic  stock  than  the 
Prussians,  are  beginning  to  ask  unpleas- 
ant questions.  They  are  getting  tired  of 
being  called  Germanic  brethren  when  it 
suits  Prussian  advantage  to  claim  them, 
and  to  be  repudiated  when  the  wind  blows 
from  another  quarter.  As  in  politics  so 
in  literature.  For  many  long  years  there 
seemed  to  be,  in  Grillparzer's  words,  a  con- 
spiracy against  Austrian  writers  in  Ger- 
many. She  looked  askance  at  the  great 
dramatist  himself,  though  she  gradually 
learned  to  adopt  him  and  other  Austrians, 

91 


just  as  she  has  adopted  Swiss  writers  like 
Gottfried  Keller  and  Konrad  Ferdinand 
Meyer. 

It  must  be  said,  in  all  fairness,  that 
since  the  elder  Andrassy's  death,  no  Aus- 
trian statesman  except  Tisza  has  made  it 
his  task  to  promote  a  genuine  alliance  be- 
tween Hapsburgs  and  Hohenzollerns. 
Count  Aehrenthal,  the  only  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  recent  years  who  has 
left  his  impress  on  Austrian  politics,  was 
concerned  purely  with  the  aggrandizement 
of  his  own  country — though  in  ways  that 
proved  disastrous  in  the  end — and  did  not 
ask  for  Germany's  consent  to  the  annex- 
ation of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  But  he 
fashioned  his  course  closely  after  her  ruth- 
less Realpolitik.  Austria  has  since  chosen 
to  identify  herself  still  more  completely 
with  Prussia's  foreign  policy,  heedless  of 
the  warning  given  to  the  Hapsburgs,  years 
ago,  by  so  stanch  a  defender  of  Prussian 
principles  as  Professor  Delbruck.  He 
wrote  (Preusmche  Jahrbiicher,  Vol.  130)  : 
"The  conception  of  nationality  has  at- 
tained in  the  nineteenth  century  through- 

92 


out  the  world  a  power  which  it  is  abso- 
lutely useless  to  contend  against.  We 
have  seen  in  the  case  of  Prussia  how  little 
even  a  state  of  its  gigantic  strength  can 
accomplish  against  a  few  million  scattered 
Poles.  The  sooner  German-Austrians 
make  up  their  minds  to  recognize  the 
equality  of  all  nationalities,  even  the  small- 
est, and  the  more  willing  they  show  them- 
selves to  make  all  the  practical  sacrifices 
inherent  in  such  a  recognition,  the  better 
it  will  be  for  them  and  for  the  German 
cause  everywhere.  The  hope  for  such  a 
consummation  lies  in  Austria's  relations  to 
Hungary  and  in  her  foreign  policy." 

The  task  of  Tisza's  successor  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  Hungary  is  clear  enough 
—there  can  be  no  retreat  from  the  principle 
of  the  equality  of  her  nationalities;  as  to 
the  future  foreign  policy  of  Austria,  that, 
as  well  as  the  foreign  policy  of  Germany, 
will  be  shaped  by  the  issue  of  the  present 
war. 


The  Poles  of  Austria 

[From  The  New  York  Nation,  July  5,  1917.] 

Appointment  of  a  stop-gap  Ministry 
gives  Emperor  Charles  a  breathing  spell 
before  grappling  definitely  with  a  serious 
crisis.  Czech  Deputies  are  rebellious,  as 
Czech  regiments  have  long  been,  and  the 
Poles  are  clamoring  for  more  emphatic 
recognition  in  the  government  of  Austria. 
All  parties  in  Galicia  have  been  watching 
events  in  Russia  closely,  and  the  course  of 
the  Poles  in  national  affairs  will  be  shaped 
by  international  developments. 

On  the  whole,  ever  since  the  ruthless 
suppression  of  the  peasant  rising  in 
Galicia,  in  1846,  the  Austrian  Government 
has  shown  distinct  partiality  and  a  cer- 
tain skill  in  its  dealings  with  the  Poles, 
favoring  the  nobility  without  actively  an- 
tagonizing the  rural  population,  and 
granting  concessions  to  the  national  spirit 
which  were  at  times  galling  enough  to 
Germans  and  Ruthenes.  In  1868  Polish 
became  the  vehicle  of  instruction  in  the 

95 


University  of  Cracow,  as  it  became  some- 
what later  in  the  University  of  Lemberg, 
and  Polish  officials  replaced  German  ones 
thoroughout  Galicia.  Von  Grocholski  en- 
tered in  1871  the  first  Austrian  Cabinet 
as  Minister  for  Galicia,  and  Polish  influ- 
ence has  since  made  itself  felt  both  in  the 
Ministries  and  in  the  Reichsrat.  Polish 
patriots  have  risen  to  leadership  in  the 
Austrian  Parliament.  Francis  Smolka, 
who  had  been  condemned  to  death  for 
treason  before  1848,  became  in  1881  Presi- 
dent of  the  Lower  House  of  the  Vienna 
Reichsrat,  and  in  more  recent  times  an- 
other Galician  Deputy,  the  Armenian 
Abrahamowicz,  occupied  the  same  place. 
Such  distinctions,  however,  were  not  won 
without  resort  to  skilful  parliamentary 
tactics,  and  sometimes  to  obstinate  opposi- 
tion to  the  methods  of  Germanizing  poli- 
ticians. The  Compromise  of  1867  was  at 
first  a  sore  trial  to  the  Poles.  Dualism, 
with  Magyar  preponderance,  was  as  little 
to  their  liking  as  Federalism,  with  Bohe- 
mian autonomy,  would  have  been.  The 
fifty-seven  Polish  Deputies,  whose  votes 

96  ' 


could  decide  important  parliamentary 
issues,  withdrew  from  the  Reichsrat.  As 
in  the  case  of  the  Czechs,  the  policy  of 
abstention  proved  successful  in  the  long 
run,  and  the  Poles  have  to  the  present  day 
been  better  able  to  maintain  their  ground 
in  the  councils  of  the  Empire  than  any 
other  of  the  Slavic  races  of  Austria. 

The  relations  between  the  Polish  aris- 
tocracy and  the  Austrian  Government 
were  badly  strained  in  1908,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  Russian  propaganda,  carried 
on  among  the  Ruthene  peasantry  of  Ga- 
licia.  To  this  Count  Szeptycki,  the 
United-Greek  Archbishop  of  Lemberg, 
who  was  subsequently  taken  into  Russian 
captivity,  but  has  since  been  released  by 
the  Provisional  Government,  lent  his  will- 
ing aid.  The  Poles,  as  ever  opposed  to 
Ukrainophile  pretensions,  were  hostile 
alike  to  the  efforts  of  Austria  and  Russia 
to  strengthen  their  hold  on  the  Ruthenes — 
the  former  through  agents  of  the  Catholic 
Church,  the  latter  through  those  of  the 
Orthodox- Greek.  The  tension,  which  led 
to  the  assassination  of  the  Governor, 

97 


Count  Potocki,  by  a  Ruthene  student,  re- 
sulted in  the  appointment,  for  the  first 
time  in  the  annals  of  Galicia,  of  a  non- 
aristocratic  Pole,  the  historian,  Dr.  Bo- 
brzynski,  to  the  Governorship.  He  en- 
deavored to  mediate,  not  with  conspicuous 
success,  between  Poles  and  Ruthenes.  The 
breach  between  them,  in  fact,  widened 
when,  in  March,  1913,  the  Governor  at- 
tempted to  carry  through  the  Galician  Diet 
a  bill  for  electoral  reform  intended  to 
effect  a  compromise.  He  was  forced  to 
resign,  and  through  his  successor,  Von 
Korytowski,  a  Polish  nobleman,  the  ruling 
classes  of  Galicia  were  once  more  brought 
closer  to  the  Vienna  Government.  Since 
then,  however,  developments  in  the  Aus- 
tro-German  alliance  have  wrought  a 
change  in  the  attitude  of  Polish  and  Ru- 
thene leaders  toward  each  other  and  to- 
ward the  Government.  The  Poles, 
through  their  spokesman,  Count  Stanilas 
Tarnowski,  president  of  the  Cracow 
Academy  of  Sciences,  had  charged  the 
Ukrainists  as  early  as  March,  1914,  in  the 
Galician  Diet,  with  close  affiliation  with 

98 


the  Pan-German  Ostmarken-Verein,  an 
association  notoriously  bent  on  destroying 
the  Polish  nationality.  The  Ruthenes 
then  plainly  showed  themselves  susceptible 
to  German  influence.  It  was  generally 
believed  by  them  that  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand,  under  instructions 
from  Berlin,  favored  the  establishment  of 
a  Ukraine  state,  to  whose  rule  the  children 
of  his  morganatic  marriage  might  suc- 
ceed. The  war  has  ended  this  dream, 
though  it  has  not  allayed  the  restlessness 
and  mutual  jealousies  of  Poles  and  Ru- 
thenes. 

The  question  of  the  resuscitation  of  the 
ancient  kingdom  of  Poland,  which  has 
now  come  to  the  front,  has  overshadowed 
the  narrower  Polish  question  in  Austria. 
Since  the  issuing  of  the  proclamation  to  all 
the  Poles  by  Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  in 
August,  1914,  there  has  been  constant 
interchange  of  thought  between  the  Polish 
leaders  of  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia. 
Sienkiewicz,  among  others,  called  on  his 
compatriots  everywhere  to  identify  them- 
selves with  the  cause  of  the  Russian  peo- 

99 


pie,  and  Count  Wielopolski,  the  president 
of  the  Polish  Club  of  the  Duma  that 
assembled  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  has 
stood  for  a  compromise  between  Russians 
and  Poles  which  was  first  advocated  by  his 
namesake,  the  Marquis  Wielopolski,  after 
the  revolution  of  1830. 

The  occupation  of  Galicia  by  the  Rus- 
sians introduced  a  new  element  of  uncer- 
tainty into  the  situation.  Attached  as 
many  of  the  prominent  Poles  were  to  the 
house  of  Hapsburg,  and  much  as  they 
resented  the  arrogance  and  brutality  of  the 
Russian  Governor,  Count  Bobrinsky,  who 
kept  Lemberg  under  the  heel  of  Russian 
autocracy,  they  yet  felt  their  Polish  senti- 
ment enlisted  by  the  liberal  stirrings  of 
Warsaw.  The  fortunes  of  war  have  ren- 
dered the  hope  of  all  Poles  for  a  restora- 
tion of  their  ancient  kingdom  not  entirely 
illusory.  Apparently,  Germany  encour- 
ages the  plans  of  Austria.  It  has  been  as- 
serted that  the  Archduke  Charles  Stephen, 
whose  sons-in-law,  Prince  Radziwill  and 
Prince  Czartoryski,  bear  names  famous  in 
the  history  of  Poland,  has  been  selected 

100 


for  the  throne  of  the  restored  kingdom; 
but  whatever  faith  Galician  Poles  may  put 
in  Austrian  promises,  they  will  look  long 
before  they  leap  into  a  Hohenzollern  trap. 
Their  position  in  the  Hapsburg  dominions 
during  the  last  fifty  years  has  been  by  no 
means  intolerable,  and  it  is  now  more  than 
ever  within  their  power  to  strengthen  their 
influence. 

The  plan  of  a  restored  Poland  under 
Hapsburg  rule  has  been  mooted  before, 
and  even  Metternich  was  not  wholly  insin- 
cere in  proposing  it  at  a  time  when  an 
alliance  with  France  and  England  agaii<st 
Russia  seemed  feasible.  Napoleon  III., 
too,  had  his  plan  for  restoring  Poland  and 
placing  it  under  the  rule  of  an  Austrian 
archduke.  Bismarck  took  notice,  during 
the  Crimean  War,  of  similar  ideas  of 
various  European  diplomatists,  but  dis- 
missed them  as  fantastic.  But  whatever 
he  thought  of  Austria  as  a  possible  ruler  of 
Poland,  he  never  deceived  himself  (as  lit- 
tle as  did  his  successor,  Prince  Biilow)  as 
to  the  hopelessness  of  any  attempt  on  the 
part  of  Prussia  to  gain  Polish  favor. 

101 


"The  love  of  the  Poles  of  Galicia  for  the 
German  Empire,"  he  wrote  in  his  Recol- 
lections, "is  of  a  fitful  and  opportunist 
nature,"  and  he  recognized  that  Austria 
had  at  all  times  a  stronger  hold  on  Polish 
sympathies  than  Germany.  He  admon- 
ished Germans  not  to  look  upon  Poles  in 
any  other  light  than  that  of  enemies,  and 
remarked  that  Austria  could  the  more 
easily  come  to  terms  with  the  Polish  move- 
ment because,  notwithstanding  the  mem- 
ories of  1846,  she  still  retained  more  of  the 
sympathy  of  Polish  nobles  than  either 
Prussia  or  Russia. 

The  world  cataclysm  has  changed  noth- 
ing in  the  relations  of  Prussia  toward  her 
Polish  subjects,  but  a  new  Russia  makes 
a  new  appeal  to  hers.  At  all  events,  there 
is  no  place  in  a  future  Poland  for  Hohen- 
zollern  influence,  no  matter  what  the  role 
of  the  Hapsburgs  may  be  in  the  nation 
that  is  to  arise  from  the  ashes  of  the  pres- 
ent war. 


102 


The  Nation's  Staff  of 
Contributors 

The  Nation  may  well  be  proud  of  its 
Staff  of  Contributors.  Started  in  1865 
by  Edwin  Lawrence  Godkin  and  Wen- 
dell Phillips  Garrison,  who  showed  re- 
markable discrimination  in  selecting 
writers  with  special  knowledge  and 
with  a  command  of  style,  this  Staff  has 
been  perpetuated  in  the  spirit  of  its 
founders.  Instead  of  turning  to  the 
facile  publicist  for  discussions  of  out- 
standing questions,  The  Nation  has 
found  that  a  thorough  knowledge  of  a 
given  subject  such  as  its  experts  possess 
does  not  prevent  the  full-hearted  utter- 
ance which  these  grave  times  require. 

Some  of  the  topics  treated  in  recent 
issues  are  the  following: 

The  Avatar  of  the  Hun,  The  Recent 
Crisis  in  Spanish  Neutrality,  The  Sub- 
marine, Peace  Without  Annexation, 
Overhauling  the  Machinery  of  Empire, 


103 


The  Aesthetic  Idealism  of  Henry 
James,  The  Sham  Argument  Against 
Latin,  Russian  Thought  and  the  Revo- 
lution, The  Weil-Paid  College  Pro- 
fessor, The  American  Tradition  and 
the  War,  China's  Coming  of  Age,  The 
Intellectual  Mobilization  of  France, 
The  Problem  of  the  New  Russia,  Italy's 
War  of  Emancipation,  Nationalist 
Ireland — The  Case  for  Home  Rule, 
Chili  and  the  World  War,  The  Position 
of  Brazil,  Why  Idealists  Quit  the 
Socialist  Party,  The  Virtuous  Vic- 
torian.. 

To  give  some  idea  of  the  great  diver- 
sity of  interests  embraced  by  its  staff 
of  contributors,  The  Nation  selects  from 
a  list  of  more  than  three  hundred  the 
following  names: 

Prof.  C.  M.  Andrews,  History,  Colonial  Period 

to  1765. 
Prof.      Irving      Babbitt,      Rousseau — Literary 

Criticism. 

Prof.  Hiram  Bingham,  South  America. 
Prof.  J.  H.  Breasted,  Egypt. 
Viscount    Bryce,    South    America — The    Near 

East — Asia  Minor. 
Prof.  C.  J.  Bullock,  Taxation. 


104 


Maj.-Gen.  W.  H.  Carter,  Riding  Horses — 
Cavalry. 

Prof.  G.  H.  Chase,  Greek  Art. 

Prof.  W.  W.  Comfort,  Mediaeval  Literature, 
France  and  Spain. 

Prof.  A.  C.  Coolidge,  Russia  and  Siberia. 

Mr.  Kenyon  Cox,  Italian  Art. 

Dr.  G.  W.  Crile,  Surgery. 

Prof.  W.  M.  Davis,  Physical  Geography. 

Prof.  F.  H.  Dixon,  Railways. 

Prof.  J.  M.  Dixon,  Japan. 

Prof.  E.  Emerton,  Church  History, 

Prof.  W.  S.  Ferguson,  Greek  and  Roman  His- 
tory. 

Mr.  Henry  T.  Finck,  Music. 

Prof.  O.  W.  Firkins,  Contemporary  Poetry. 

Prof.  Warner  Fite,  Philosophy. 

Mr.  W.  C.  Ford,  Early  American  History. 

Dr.  Fabian  Franklin,  Economic  Theory. 

Prof.  H.  N.  Gardiner,  Psychology. 

Prof.  F.  H.  Giddings,  Sociology. 

Prof.  G.  L.  Goodale,  Botany. 

Prof.  T.  D.  Goodell,  Metrics. 

Admiral  C.  F.  Goodrich,  The  Navy. 

Prof.  C.  H.  Grandgent,  Romance  Languages. 

Dr.  L.  H.  Gray,  The  Aryan  East. 

Prof.  A.  D.  F.  Hamlin,  Architecture. 

Prof.   S.   N.   Harper,   Russian   History. 

Prof.  C.  H.  Haskins,  Spanish  Inquisition — 
Normans — P  alaeography . 

Prof.  F.  H.  Herrick,  Biology. 

Prof.  E.  W.  Hopkins,  Sanskirt. 

Prof.  W.  H.  Howell,  Physiology. 

Prof.  J.  A.  Jaggar,  Geology. 

Prof.  Morris  Jastrow,  Jr.,  Babylonia  and 
Assyria. 


105 


Prof.  A.  G.  Keller,  Sociology. 

Prof.  J.  F.  Kemp,  Metallurgy. 

Prof.  C.  J.  Keyser,  Mathematics. 

Mr.  F.  E.  Leupp,  Social  and  Political  Remini- 
scences. 

Dr.  Jacques  Loeb,  Artificial  Production  of  Life. 

Prof.  A.  O.  Lovejoy,  Philosophy — Academic 
Freedom 

Prof.  William  MacDonald,  American  Political 
History. 

Prof.  F.  J.  Mather,  Jr.,  Art. 

Dr.  Paul  E.  More,  Literature. 

Prof.  W.  B.  Munro,  Government. 

Mr.  A.  D.  Noyes,  Finance. 

Prof.  G.  R.  Noyes,  Russian  Language  and  Lit- 
erature. 

Prof.  R.  M.  Pearce,  Scientific  Features  of 
Modern  Medicine. 

Mr.  I.  R.  Pennypacker,  Civil  War  Campaigns. 

Prof.  J.  B.  Pratt,  Ethics — Religions  of  Modern 
India. 

Prof.  G.  M.  Priest,  German  History  and  Gov- 
ernment. 

Mrs.  G.  H.  Putnam,  French  Literature  and 
Life. 

Prof.  E.  K.  Rand,  The  Classics  in  Relation  to 
Modern  Literature. 

Miss  G.  M.  A.  Richter,  Archaeology,  Greece  and 
Rome. 

Dr.   Edward  Robinson,  Greek  Art. 

Prof.  F.  N.  Robinson,  Irish  and  Welsh. 

Dr.  George  Sarton,  History  of  Science. 

Prof.  H.  R.  Seager,  Economics — Social  Insur- 
ance. 

Prof.  S.  P.  Sherman,  Modern  English  Litera- 
ture. 


106 


Prof.  Paul  Shorey,  Greek  Literature  and  Phil- 
osophy 

Prof.  Munroe  Smith,  German  History. 

Prof.  E.  C.  Stowell,  International  Law. 

Dr.  E.  G.  Tabet,  Syria — Turkey. 

Prof.  F.  W.  Taussig,  Economics,  Tariff. 

Mr.  W.  R.  Thayer,  Italian  History. 

Prof.  Lynn  Thorndike — Mediaeval  Culture — 
Superstitions. 

Prof.  David  Todd,  Astronomy. 

Prof.  A.  M.  Tozzer,  Central  and  South  Ameri- 
can Archaeology. 

Prof.  E.  R.  Turner,  European  Political  History. 

Prof.  A.  G.  Webster,  Electricity — General 
Physics. 

Mr.  F.  Weitenkampf,  Etchings  and  Prints. 

Prof.  J.  R.  Wheeler,  Greek  Sculpture. 

Prof.  J.  H.  Wigmore,  Criminal  Law. 

Lieut.-Col.  C.  de  W.  Willcox,  The  Army. 

Prof.  F.  W.  Williams,  China. 

Mr.  T.  F.  Woodlock,  Socialism — Railways. 

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